


Outline and preface

Preface-three key points:

- Tourism share 15-20% of value-added (GDP)—what happens really matters
- Government share 25%: 10% military, 6% civilian, 9% state and local
- Average duration of post-1982 U.S. economic expansion is 8 years; this is year 5

Hawaii economic value-added (GDP) shares in tourism and military: combined approx. 25%



See also:

James Mak, 2005. "Tourism demand and output in the U.S. Tourism Satellite Accounts: 1998-2003," *Journal of Travel Research*, **44** (1), pp. 4-5 Eugene Tian, James Mak, and PingSun Leung, "The direct and indirect contributions of tourism to regional GDP: Hawaii," *UHERO Working Paper No. 2011-5* (July 28, 2011) (https://www.uhero.hawaii.edu/assets/WP_2011-5.pdf)

DBEDT State of Hawaii Data Book (http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/databook/2010-individual/07/073410.xls)

James Hosek, Aviva Litovitz, Adam C. Resnick, 2011 "How Much Does Military Spending Add to Hawaii's Economy?" *Rand Corporation Technical Report TR-996* (http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR996.html); note that this report incorrectly *doubles* the military share of Hawaii GDP to inflate its "association" with other industries using input-output multipliers, which is like doubling everything.

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U.S. economic expansions, contractions: odds are this expansion is half over

Duration of economic expansions and contractions from NBER troughs to peaks and back again

	Expansions			Contractions		
in months	Mean	Median	Max	Mean	Median	Max
1857-1928	25.5	22	46	20.5	18	65 *
1929-1982	46.2	39	106 **	13.8	11	43 [†]
1983-2010	95.0	92	120 •	11.3	8	18 ^Δ

^{*}The Panic (Oct. 1873 - Mar. 1879)

[†]The Great Depression (Aug. 1929 - Mar. 1933)

^{**}Camelot (Feb. 1961 - Dec. 1969)

^{*}dot.com (Mar. 1991 - Mar. 2001)

[∆]The Great Recession (Dec. 2007 - Jun. 2009)


Outline

- 1. Tourism
- 2. Housing
- 3. Construction
- 4. Macroeconomic outlook


Hawaii tourism was declining during 2013

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
Seasonally-adjusted statewide visitor arrivals declined since late last year: demand or supply?




Statewide total visitor days (s.a.): growth stalled




Total seats to Hawaii through October 2013 (s.a.): after two pushes (2010, 2012) capacity flattened




Real Hawaii visitor expenditure (s.a.) through 2013Q3



Relationship between hotel occupancy rate and real hotel room rate appreciation getting "steeper"



Visitor days growing faster than capacity (more highly-utilized): past 2.5 visitors/room "sold out"



E estimated based on January-October 2013 data


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Musical chairs? Recent visitor arrivals (s.a.) losing ground except in "other foreign" category—new Asia





(http://uhero.prognoz.com/TableR.aspx).




1. Tourism

- Tourism leadership in "first half" now impaired by capacity constraint
- No more rooms ⇒ higher room rates at faster rates of increase
- Higher lodging expense reduces: (a) stay length; (b) non-lodging outlay/visitor; and (c) total real (inflation-adjusted) tourism export receipts
- Loss of momentum in U.S., Japan, Canada arrivals: probably not "demand"
- 2. Housing
- 3. Construction
- 4. Macroeconomic outlook

Housing trends: cyclical recovery hindered by slow-moving regulatory process


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The (Mike) Sklarz Curve: Oahu home price appreciation, lagged inventory remaining 1994-2013




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
Monthly Oahu median existing home sales prices




California, Neighbor Island existing single-family home median sales prices: strong co-movement




Median single-family existing home sales prices: replicating the last (early-2000s) price acceleration




Hawaii existing home sales outpace new residential units permitted (especially slow Neighbor Isle recovery)



Annual new housing units authorized by building permit




Hawaii now: population growth > housing formation



oMilitary downsizing (BRAC) Projection to 2020 with Koa Ridge, Ho'opili, Kakaako; assumes housing cycle tapers after 2017 (next slide)

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Oahu annual new housing units authorized by building permit actual and projected for 20-teens



Projection assumes that existing home sales prices rise 15% annually 2014-2017 to approximately \$1 million (SF), \$530k (condo), long-term Treasury bond yields rise to 4% by 2015, production of 5,500 high-rise condominium units in Kakaako is completed but absorption reduces notional annual production amounts at Koa Ridge (300 units) and Ho'opili (500 units) by one-third in 2017 and two-thirds in 2018 at the end of a U.S. economic expansion of average duration for the post-1970s era (eight years)



1. Tourism


2. Housing

- Tight inventory: model predicts10-15 percent appreciation in 2014
- Housing market fundamentals improving, demand outstripping supply
- Upswing will face headwinds: eroding affordability, rising interest rates
- Production constraints limit homebuilding to less than population growth
- (Regulatory, geographic constraints amplify valuation cycle in housing)
- 3. Construction
- 4. Macroeconomic outlook

Construction: head fake—PV panels are not buildings

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Recent growth of Hawaii real private building permits dominated by equipment* (PV), not new structures




*Building permits are required for installation of photovoltaic equipment, but investment (gross capital formation) customarily distinguishes structures from equipment and software—buying a diesel generator for hurricane preparedness may be a good idea but it's not building (the verb) a building (the noun), nor is the installation of rooftop photovoltaic panels

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Sources: County building departments, Hawaii DBEDT, U.S. Bureau of the Census; seasonal adjustment, deflation and trend-cycle extraction by TZ Economics


Construction receipts and jobs correlate, but buying PV or a diesel generator is equipment investment



*Excludes military housing privatization which was tax-exempt

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
Construction jobs not keeping up with spending




*Excludes military housing privatization which was tax-free

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
Real new residential building permits: lagging




Real new commercial building permits: lagging worse



Quarterly real government construction contracts to mid-2013: signs of life or deferred maintenance?



Annual real government construction in Hawaii, through 2012



Federal, state, county contracts*
(Million 2012 dollars)

Totals relative to Hawaii output (percent of GDP)

*Excludes military housing privatization which is not public, duh

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- 1. Halfway into the current economic expansion
- 2. Housing

3. Construction


- Recovery is partly a head fake: PV panels are equipment, not buildings*
- Construction of new buildings recovering less quickly; commercial not at all
- Homebuilding mired in acronymphobia (LUC, DPP, HCDA, HHFDC, DHHL...)
- After rising, public construction as % of GDP still less than fifty years ago
- 4. Macroeconomic outlook

^{*}As in "building permit," the noun, not the verb


Macroeconomic outlook: growth with challenges

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U.S. real GDP growth forecasts (December 2013): October federal shutdown masked strong third quarter



Composition of U.S. real GDP since 2010: consumption-, investment-, and export-led growth




Compound annual growth of real U.S. GDP government components highlight shifting sources of fiscal drag


	Expansion to-date	First 2 years 09Q2-11Q2	Second 2 years 11Q2-13Q3
GDP	2.3	2.25	2.36
Government	-1.5	-1.5	-1.4
Federal National defense Nondefense State and local	-1.1 -2.1 0.7 -1.7	1.1 0.8 1.8 -3.3	-3.0 -4.5 -0.3 -0.3

Hawaii math: 0.25 of economy (public sector) is growing –1.5% per annum 0.75 of economy (private sector) is growing +3.5% Overall economy grows 2.25%


Hawaii quarterly real personal income growth (puka) and contemporaneous Honolulu inflation rates (line)



Hawaii and U.S. unemployment rates(s.a.): Fed threshold, 6.5%, before short-term rates rise




Distributions of FOMC participant's forecasts for the fed funds target rate and weighted averages




Number of observations (FOMC participants, total = 17)

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
Treasury constant-maturity yields (term structure) and fed funds rate trajectory implied by the FOMC




Hawaii Council on Revenues multi-year forecasts for nominal General Fund revenue growth since FY1999



The \$6.4 billion dollar question: will real General Fund revenue exceed \$5.4 billion (12 mos. to 9/13)?



Constant-dollar Hawaii general fund revenues actually have declined for 5 quarters recently (1 outlier)




Outline

- 1. Halfway into the current economic expansion
- 2. Housing
- 3. Construction

4. Macroeconomic outlook

- U.S. real GDP growth forecast: 2% going to 3% (Hawaii too)
- Private sector growth despite fiscal drag, now from federal government
- Oil-driven inflation shocks were temporary; tighter labor markets coming
- Normalization of monetary policy will raise interest rates—more drag
- General fund revenues exceed forecast, boom and bust; position for latter



Mahalo!


Slides available from:

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Kailua, Hawaii 96734-4430
paulbrewbaker@tzeconomics.com

Appendix 1: NABE September 2013 forecast

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
U.S. real GDP growth forecasts (September 2013): actual third quarter growth closer to high end




Appendix 2: Tourism has not grown since 1990

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
Tourism dilemma—higher volumes, *lower* receipts; binding constraint: 75k rooms (2012) vs. 73k (1992)



Older Hawaii tourism forecast (fall 2009): nobody believed it possible but visitor arrivals grew




2011 forecasts too low, 2012 too high (especially mine): failing to identify lodging capacity constraint



Appendix 3. State of Hawaii is not saving enough


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State cash balances historically provided deeper "insurance" coverage than during the last cycle



Sources:

Another fund: unemployment rate falls to 3%, wage base, tax rate revert to "normal"—adequate funding?




Source: Hawaii DLIR (special correspondence and http://hawaii.gov/labor/reports/annual/2011-4/program/UTF%20FY2011.pdf); deflation by TZE using Honolulu CPI-U; even agressive restoration of funding parameters and a good economy may not rebuild the fund fast enough


Appendix 4. Homebuilding really is that low

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Neighbor Island quarterly new housing units authorized by building permit: nothing but upside




Oahu quarterly new housing units authorized by building permit: growth but fast enough?



adjustment and trend extraction by TZE


New housing units as % of housing stock(-1)



Appendix 5: Honolulu Phillips Curves

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Honolulu inflation and unemployment since 2007: oil shocks (2008, 2010-11); into "The Zone" 2013



Fed inflation goal (2%) defines LR equilibrium; Oahu housing cycle exerts "clockwise" tendency

