### A BILL FOR AN ACT

RELATING TO THE APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT PREFERENCE.

#### BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII:

SECTION 1. Section 103-55.6, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 1 repealed. 2 ["[\$103-55.6] Public works construction; apprenticeship 3 agreement. (a) A governmental body, as defined in section 4 103D-104, that enters into a public works contract under this 5 chapter having an estimated value of not less than \$250,000, 6 7 shall decrease the bid amount of a bidder by five per cent if the bidder is a party to an apprenticeship agreement registered 8 9 with the department of labor and industrial relations for each 10 apprenticeable trade the bidder will employ to construct the 11 public works, and in conformance with chapter 372. The lowest 12 total bid, taking the preference into consideration, shall be 13 awarded the contract unless the solicitation provides for additional award criteria. The contract amount awarded, 14 however, shall be the amount of the price offered, exclusive of 15 the preference. 16 17 (b) For purposes of subsection (a), in determining whether 18 there is conformance with chapter 372, the procurement officer

### k.B. NO. 877

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shall consider the actual number of apprentices enrolled in and
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    the annual number of graduates of the apprenticeship program.
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         (c) At the time of submission of a competitive sealed bid
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    or a competitive sealed proposal by a bidder, the bidder shall
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    furnish written proof of being a party to a registered
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    apprenticeship agreement for each apprenticeable trade the
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   bidder will employ to construct the public works and, if awarded
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    the contract, shall continue to certify monthly in writing that
   the bidder is a party to a registered apprenticeship agreement
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    for each apprenticeable trade the bidder will employ to
   construct the public works for the entire duration of the
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   bidder's work on the project. This subsection shall be deemed
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    to be incorporated into a public works contract. A bidder who
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   is awarded a contract shall be subject to the following
    sanctions if, after commencement of work, the bidder at any time
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    during the construction is no longer a party to a registered
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   apprenticeship agreement for each apprenticeable trade the
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   bidder will employ to construct the public works:
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         (1) Temporary or permanent cessation of work on the
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             project, without recourse to breach of contract claims
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   by the bidder; provided that the governmental body shall be
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# <u>к</u>.В. NO. <u>817</u>

1	entitled to restitution for nonperformance or liquidated
2	<del>damages, as appropriate; or</del>
3	(2) Proceedings to debar or suspend under section 103D
4	<del>702.</del>
5	(d) For purposes of this section, "bidder" means an entity
6	that submits a competitive scaled bid under section 103D-302 or
7	submits a competitive sealed proposal under section 103D-303."]
8	SECTION 2. This Act does not affect rights and duties that
9	matured, penalties that were incurred, and proceedings that were
0	begun before its effective date.
1	SECTION 3. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed
2	and stricken.
3	SECTION 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
4	
5	INTRODUCED BY:
6	BY REQUEST
	JAN 2 5 2021

Report Title:

#### Apprenticeship

#### Description:

Repeals the public works construction bid performance for parties to registered apprenticeship agreements provided by section 103-55.6, Hawaii Revised Statutes.

### JUSTIFICATION SHEET

H.B. No. 877

DEPARTMENT:

Accounting and General Services

TITLE:

A BILL FOR AN ACT RELATING TO THE APPRENTICESHIP AGREEMENT PREFERENCE.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this bill is to eliminate the Apprenticeship Agreement Preference in an effort to increase the economy, effectiveness, and impartiality of the public works construction procurement process.

MEANS:

Repeal section 103-55.6, Hawaii Revised Statutes.

JUSTIFICATION:

Section 103-55.6 was intended to incentivize the use of State-certified apprenticeship programs by bidders to ensure a well-trained work force for public works construction. However, we are unaware of any statistical evidence that this legislation has been responsible for increased enrollment or participation in apprenticeship programs. Instead, it has had a number of unintended consequences that are contrary to the Legislature's goal to increase the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and impartiality of the public works construction procurement process.

The preference has decreased the economy of the construction procurement process because it has required government agencies to reduce(for evaluation purposes) the bid price of qualified bidders by five percent. This has resulted in awards being made to bidders at increased costs of up to five percent, or as much as \$50,000 more for every \$1,000,000 of construction cost, whenever the preference has made a difference in the bid order, all in the absence of any evidence that the State

### H. & N. 877

is obtaining a benefit that justifies the added cost.

The apprenticeship agreement preference has also decreased the efficiency of the construction procurement process. It has prolonged the procurement process because it is often difficult for agencies to determine who qualifies for the preference. In accordance with Comptroller's Memorandum 2011-25, these determinations must be made on a project- and bidder- specific basis. The difficulty of making these determinations is increased by the fact that much of the information needed to make it is not readily available to procurement personnel based on the information contained in the bid packages (i.e., information about multi-skilled workers a bidder intends to employ, the manner in which a bidder intends to accomplish certain components of work, etc.). It also requires procurement personnel to be knowledgeable about construction trade-work.

Since agencies must make both project- and bidspecific determinations about which bidders
qualify for the preference based on bidderprovided information which is often incomplete
and therefore not transparent to all bidders,
the impartiality of decisions made by
procurement personnel with regard to application
of the preference may be called into question,
thereby damaging perceptions regarding the
integrity of the procurement process. The
appearance of partiality may be further
enhanced by the presence of ambiguities in the
legislation, making its terms and application
subject to different interpretations among the
procuring agencies.

In order to qualify for the preference, bidders must be party to a registered apprenticeship agreement for each

## H.B. Ns. 817

apprenticeable trade the bidder will employ to construct the public works project. Due to the disparity between the number of State-certified apprenticeship programs sponsored by union versus non-union sponsors (thirty-six union-sponsored apprenticeship programs vs. five non-union-sponsored programs), the legislation also appears to favor unionized contractors, because it is more likely that a unionized contractor can self-perform more work and qualify for the preference.

The apprenticeship agreement preference has also been the subject of a number of protests. Since procurement actions are statutorily stayed until resolution of the protest, bid protests involving application of the apprenticeship preference have delayed the procurement process.

In summary, the apprenticeship agreement preference should be removed from the procurement process because the number and scope of negative impacts due to its implementation do not appear to be justified by measurable indicators showing it has achieved its original intent.

Impact on the public: Removal of this preference would eliminate the potential increased cost for construction due to the preference, and it would increase transparency in the procurement of construction services.

Impact on the department and other agencies:
Removing this preference from the
procurement code would increase the
efficiency and transparency of the bid
evaluation process and eliminate the
negative impacts created by this preference
(including differences in interpretation
between agencies, protests resulting from
the preference, added costs of construction,
etc.).

If the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations determines that there is a continued need to increase enrollment in the apprenticeship programs, it will need to find alternative means which do not impact the procurement process to achieve that goal.

GENERAL FUND:

None.

OTHER FUNDS:

None.

PPBS PROGRAM

DESIGNATION:

AGS 221.

OTHER AFFECTED

AGENCIES:

All state and county departments and agencies procuring construction services.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

Upon approval.