




- Colleagues from DBEDT and UHERO will present numerical economic forecasts
- Also available: November 2011 estimates from HPU Professor Leroy Laney
- This presentation: three observations about 2011 framing the 2012 outlook
  - Noise obscures the signal
  - 2. Double-dip is for dorks
  - 3. Are our economic forecasts too high or too low?

See: UHERO's November state forecast at <a href="http://uhero.hawaii.edu/products/view/312">http://uhero.hawaii.edu/products/view/312</a>, DBEDT's November 2011 quarterly forecast update at <a href="http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/data\_reports/qser">http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/data\_reports/qser</a>, and Dr. Laney's economic forecasts, with additional commentary from UH Shidler College Professor Jack Suyderhoud, at <a href="https://www.fhb.com/pdf/FHB\_OahuEconForecast2011.pdf">https://www.fhb.com/pdf/FHB\_OahuEconForecast2011.pdf</a>.

#### Noise obscures the signal: a tourism example


- A tourism year 2011 punctuated by 3 shocks:
  - 1. North African political upheaval raised global petroleum prices and aviation fuel costs—
    reducing the supply of travel (higher cost), decreasing the number of scheduled seats
    (also appearing as higher air fares)
  - 2. Northeast Japan earthquake and tsunami temporarily depressed Japanese travel demand over a period of about 6 months (most sharply at first, gradually recovering) [partial offset: yen appreciation]
  - 3. Prospective *Hawaii APEC meetings* raised uncertainty about positive (more diplomats) vs. negative (fewer weddings) impacts of a meeting scheduled for "11-11-11"
- As all three shocks came and went, underlying economic recovery and its manifestation in visitor arrivals shined through (for December 2011, passenger arrivals up 4.5%; estimated 3.5% arrivals growth in the September-December trimester)
- Is tourism on the 3-4% growth trend implied by recent data, or on the 2-3% forecast path?
- Much media/press release noise about "record" nominal tourism receipts obscures the reality of low real tourism receipts, after inflation adjustment, on par with the late-1980s

#### First of all, this is how visitor arrivals are reported, full of seasonal "noise" obscuring the "signal"



seasonal adjustment using Census X-12 ARIMA filter by TZE

### Hawaii visitor arrivals, seasonally-adjusted, through November 2011—"revealing" the shocks




Census X-12 ARIMA filter by TZE

#### Visitor arrivals growth rates

(percent changes, y-o-y)	2011	2012
Forecasts:		
DBEDT	2.5	3.4
UHERO	2.1	2.7
Laney	3.2	2.6
Implied actual*		
Sep-Dec	3.3	
November visitors	3.6	
December passengers	4.5	
2011 total	2.3	
"No tsunami" addendum:		
Counterfactual trend <sup>†</sup>	3.9	


<sup>\*</sup>including December *passenger* arrivals growth as visitor arrivals growth proxy

In retrospect—using December passenger counts to "guess" 2011 arrivals—one could say that 2011 would have been a better year *but for* the shocks [oil (–), tsunami (–), APEC (±)]. Arrivals growth was certainly stronger *after* their impacts "burned out," even if the overall performance *includes* the shocks.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Calculated from fall 2010 to fall 2011 ignoring the Japan seismic event

### Hawaii visitor arrivals, s.a., along counterfactual "no shock" trend: record arrivals by end 2012?



### Tourism receipts after inflation haven't risen (on trend) since 1980s—failed "more dollars" strategy




# Double Dip this


- Fear Factor in 2010: double-dip recession
- Fear Factor in 2011: *double-dip in home prices*
- The moral of these stories: tune in tomorrow—they mean to scare the crap out of you
- The reality: uneven recovery *has* proceeded even where housing prices came under additional downward pressure
- Additional reality: Honolulu is not one of those markets; ¾ of Hawaii's statewide economy is an island of economic resilience and growth in a sea of comparatively poor recent economic performance

Don't confuse Oahu for the Neighbor Islands, or Hawaii for the mainland

#### S&P 500 conditional volatility is in top five since WWII




### Spring (May) 2011: double-dip headlines keep double-dip recession fears alive




Home Prices Double Dip to Levels Before Housing Bubble Burst

### "Slow-moving' capital" one version of "overshooting" models of asset price dynamics




"The key implication is that supply or demand shocks must be absorbed on short notice by a limited set of investors. The risk aversion or limited capital of the currently available investors, including intermediaries, leads them to require a price concession in order to absorb the supply or demand shock. They plan to 'lay off' the associated risk over time as other investors become available. As a result, the initial price impact is followed by a price reversal that may occur over an extended period of time."




Simulated asset price dynamics in a logistic growth model


### S&P 500 Index daily closing values: markets concerned about U.S. Congressional fiscal policy-making FAILs




### Real overshooting: Japanese passenger arrivals growth and the Great Tohoku seismic event



### Oahu single-family median existing home sales prices from 2003 through 2011:




### Oahu housing market most stable—relatively—of Hawaii Islands and many mainland urban markets




Sources: Honolulu Board of Realtors, Realtors Association of Maui, National Association of Realtors, Kauai Board of Realtors / Hawaii Information Service; seasonal adjustment by TZE using Census X-12 ARIMA filter

### S&P Case-Shiller price indexes ("relative to Jan 2000"): "double-dip" in home prices in many mainland markets



### Median CA existing single-family home prices: "double-dip" or "overshooting + oscillation?"




#### Stabilization in the transition to expansion

- For two years, financial media have been beating the drum of "double-dip" recession risk
- Oscillation is part of asset price equilibration following extreme adjustment, a *normal* part of the process of transition from economic recovery to economic expansion, following severe macroeconomic breaks such as the financial crisis of 2007-08 and recession of 2008-09
- Both systemic risk exposure (including contagion exposure to European sovereign debt risk) and event risk exposure (such as last year's geopolitical events in North Africa—affecting Hawaii via oil prices—as well as Japan's seismic event) are always present
- I guarantee even more such surprises in 2012, and forever after
- You cannot spend your entire time frozen in fear of the unknown—especially when underlying trends are validating the recovery/expansion forecast


#### Are our forecasts too optimistic, or too pessimistic?

## U.S. real GDP indexed to cyclical peaks: deep recession, slow recovery, definitive expansion



\*Recessions since World War II—averages aligned to peak quarter of each business cycle and to 2007Q4

#### U.S. real GDP growth NABE forecasts November 2011



\*Includes November 22, 2011 release

(<a href="http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm">http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm</a>)

#### Federal Reserve economic outlook November 2011: real GDP growth 2.5-2.9% forecast for 2012

#### Percent

Variable	Central tendency <sup>1</sup>			Range <sup>2</sup>						
	2011	2012	2013	2014	Longer run	2011	2012	2013	2014	Longer run
Change in real GDP June projection		2.5 to 2.9 3.3 to 3.7		3.0 to 3.9 n.a.	2.4 to 2.7 2.5 to 2.8	1.6 to 1.8 2.5 to 3.0	2.3 to 3.5 2.2 to 4.0	2.7 to 4.0 3.0 to 4.5	2.7 to 4.5 n.a.	2.2 to 3.0 2.4 to 3.0
Unemployment rate June projection		8.5 to 8.7 7.8 to 8.2			5.2 to 6.0 5.2 to 5.6	8.9 to 9.1 8.4 to 9.1	8.1 to 8.9 7.5 to 8.7	7.5 to 8.4 6.5 to 8.3	6.5 to 8.0 n.a.	5.0 to 6.0 5.0 to 6.0
PCE inflation June projection	2.7 to 2.9 2.3 to 2.5	1.4 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0		1.5 to 2.0 n.a.	1.7 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0		1.4 to 2.8 1.2 to 2.8	1.4 to 2.5 1.3 to 2.5	1.5 to 2.4 n.a.	1.5 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0
Core PCE inflation <sup>3</sup> June projection				1.5 to 2.0 n.a.		1.7 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.3	1.3 to 2.1 1.2 to 2.5	1.4 to 2.1 1.3 to 2.5	1.4 to 2.2 n.a.	

NOTE: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant's assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The June projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on June 21-22, 2011.

- 1. The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
- 2. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants' projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.
- 3. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.

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
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### Hawaii *national* forecasts are at the low end of the range


	2011		2012				
(percent changes as noted)	Q3p	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	
Real Hawaii personal income gr	owth						
DBEDT	1.3			1.2			
UHERO	1.3			0.9			
Laney	1.0			0.9			
Real U.S. GDP growth							
DBEDT	1.4			1.8			
UHERO	1.7			2.1			
Actual	1.8	n.a.					
NABE		2.5	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.8	
Top five	2.0			3.8			
Median	1.7			2.4			
Bottom five	1.2			0.9			
Federal Reserve	1.6-1.7			2.3-3.5	5		

Sources: as noted elsewhere in this presentation, National Association for Business Economics (NABE) (November 2011) <a href="http://nabe.com/publib/macsum.html">http://nabe.com/publib/macsum.html</a> and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (December 22, 2011), U.S. Department of Commerce <a href="http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp">http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp</a>; last four rows are Q4/Q4 growth rates, quarterly growth rates are annualized, other are year-over-year estimates

#### Job growth? Oahu has, Neighbor Islands don't



#### Hawaii general fund tax revenues: signal vs. noise



#### **Grains of Hawaiian rock salt**

- Published forecasts for U.S. real GDP growth from Hawaii sources (DBEDT, UHERO) are in the lower half of the range of FRB and NABE counterparts
- Notwithstanding forecasters' concerns during second half 2009 and throughout the years 2010 and 2011, the following are true:
  - 1. Recession ended in mid-2009, as anticipated by at least some analysts
  - 2. Recovery ended in mid-2011, as anticipated by at least some analysts
  - 3. Transition to economic expansion (nationwide) came from a deeper trough, took longer and proceeded more slowly than at any time since the Great Depression of the 1930s
  - 4. U.S. economic expansion, rooted in mid-2009, punched out in mid-2011 and, led by Oahu, a contemporaneous rebound has occurred in Hawaii
- Hawaii has been a better than average state from an economic performance standpoint since the end of the last economic expansion (December 2007), though as a whole the recession-recovery cycle in Hawaii has largely followed the path of the national economy:
  - 1. The worst performing parts of the state, the Neighbor Islands, collectively comprise approximately ¼ of the total and approximately *matched* national economic performance
  - 2. The remaining ¾ of the total comprising Oahu's economy would be among the better performing state economies in the country, currently, without the Neighbor Islands
  - 3. Recovery patterns are consistent across a variety of Hawaii indicators, including general fund tax revenues (some of which are illustrated in the appendix)

