Section 2.  The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

     In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

     The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

 

Law Journals and Reviews

 

  The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990:  Historic Changes in Federal Civil Procedure Aimed at Improving the Efficiency of Federal Courts and Reducing the Uncertainty and Cost Associated with Federal Litigation.  23 HBJ 41.

  Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson:  Standing to Challenge Governmental Actions.  12 UH L. Rev. 435.

  Evolution of the Act of State Doctrine:  W.S. Kirkpatrick Corp. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. and Beyond.  13 UH L. Rev. 687.

  Hawai`i's Justiciability Doctrine.  26 UH L. Rev. 537.

  How to Transfer Venue When You Only Have One:  The Problem of High Profile Criminal Jury Trials in American Samoa.  29 UH L. Rev. 325.

  Standing Down:  The Negative Consequences of Expanding Hawai`i's Doctrine of Standing.  30 UH L. Rev. 475.

  Setting Aside Transfers of Property in Foreign Countries:  How Long Is the Reach of the United States Bankruptcy Court?  32 UH L. Rev. 53 (2009).

  Intervening in the Public's Interest Before the Maui County Planning Commission, Hawai`i.  44 UH L. Rev. 1 (2022).

 

Case Notes

 

  Where individual plaintiffs claimed that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violated provisions of the commerce clause and tax clause by requiring Americans to purchase minimum essential health care coverage, plaintiffs were unable to establish standing under this Article because they were unable to show that government action was causally connected to the plaintiffs' injury, as the minimum essential coverage provision had no means of enforcement as described in the Act.  593 U.S. 659 (2021).

  Standing of various taxpayers to challenge alleged unconstitutionality of OHA programs.  741 F.2d 1169.

  Case or controversy requirement satisfied by cloud on title created by litigation and language of court decisions.  753 F.2d 1468.

  Native Hawaiian group had standing to bring injunctive action for violation of Admission Act.  764 F.2d 623.

  Alleged past mistreatment of litigant, by itself, was insufficient to demonstrate likelihood of future deprivations for purposes of meeting case or controversy requirement.  961 F.2d 852.

  Congress had power through "arising under" clause to enact alien tort statute.  978 F.2d 493.

  District courts have original jurisdiction under Alien Tort Act for suit by alien for wrongful death, committed by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the law of nations.  25 F.3d 1467.

  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not apply when action is against estate of an individual foreign official whose actions were outside the official's scope of authority.  25 F.3d 1467.

  Plaintiffs, Hawai`i medicaid recipients who suffered from tobacco-related illnesses, had standing in suit against state officials, where plaintiffs alleged that the officials violated and continued to violate federal disbursement rules for medicaid recovery.  311 F.3d 929.

  Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the restriction on office of Hawaiian affairs trustee appointments to Hawaiians, because plaintiffs neither alleged nor provided evidence of any injury related to the appointment process.  314 F.3d 1091.

  Appellant lacked standing to challenge (1) office of Hawaiian affairs business loan program where appellant failed to demonstrate an injury in fact; and (2) native Hawaiian eligibility requirement for Hawaiian homestead leases because appellant's injury was not redressable.  342 F.3d 934.

  Appellant who contended, among other things, injury by the provisions of article XII of the state constitution and chapter 10 personally subjecting appellant to racial classification, lacked standing as appellant did not suffer an injury in fact. 342 F.3d 934.

  Appellant was properly tried and convicted in the U.S. district court for the district of Hawaii for committing federal crimes in American Samoa, where, inter alia, venue was proper in the district of Hawaii under 18 U.S.C. §3238.  472 F.3d 638.

  Plaintiffs who challenged the department of Hawaiian home lands (DHHL)/Hawaiian homes commission (HHC) lease eligibility programs in their capacity as state taxpayers, lacked standing to sue the United States and the United States remained an indispensable party to any challenge to the DHHL/HHC lease eligibility criteria; plaintiffs did not have standing as state taxpayers to challenge the appropriation of state revenue to the office of Hawaiian affairs.  477 F.3d 1048.

  Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief arising from the government's seizure of marijuana met the constitutional requirements and prudential factors for ripeness, and plaintiffs had associational standing to assert the claims; seizure of plaintiffs' marijuana that had already occurred created a justiciable case and controversy about plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory entitlement to use marijuana for religious purposes; adjudication of plaintiffs' claims did not require that the court entangle itself in hypothetical scenarios or "abstract disagreements".  676 F.3d 829 (2012).

  Plaintiff wedding event professionals association had Article III standing to assert claims on behalf of those who sought to marry on an unencumbered state beach in Hawaii; application of department of land and natural resources regulations to commercial weddings had resulted in economic injury to "vendors", that is, to the members of the association, who organized such weddings; members of association were "subject to sanction and loss of license for violation of the [regulations]", making them "a proper party in interest...."  682 F.3d 789 (2012).

  Plaintiffs lacked standing, where they asserted that the cabotage provisions of the Jones Act violated the commerce clause.  Although plaintiffs' claim was not a generalized grievance because the alleged harm was not entirely of an abstract and indefinite nature, plaintiffs alleged facts showing that two companies may well have engaged in their injury-inflicting actions even in the absence of the government's challenged conduct, and plaintiffs did not show a likelihood that the shipping companies would lower their prices if the challenged provisions of the Jones Act were invalidated.  795 F.3d 1012 (2015).

  Organic farmers had standing to seek declaratory judgment upholding validity of county ordinance, adopted through initiative process, which banned genetically engineered (GE) activities and/or cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMO).  Although the farmers had alleged that transgenic contamination and the drift of windborne pesticides could affect their customer base, who would not purchase GE food, and that they had been forced to relocate their farming operations, the county had declined to defend the ordinance.  842 F.3d 688 (2016).

  Where defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, district court erred in imposing treatment conditions that gave probation officer authority to require inpatient treatment as part of defendant's supervised release.  A condition that plainly read delegates to a nonjudicial officer the power to decide the nature or extent of the punishment is unconstitutional.  53 F.4th 1144 (2022).

  Statute authorizing search and seizure of psychiatrist's records inflicts "injury in fact" which satisfies case or controversy requirement.  481 F. Supp. 1028.

  Case or controversy presented.  588 F. Supp. 889; 590 F. Supp. 778.

  No standing to sue for price-fixing and monopoly since no showing that alleged price-fixing caused injury.  606 F. Supp. 584.

  Whether liability coverage existed was case or controversy even before insured's liability determined.  608 F. Supp. 383.

  No alienage jurisdiction where aliens on both sides of litigation.  778 F. Supp. 1535.

  No case or controversy where plaintiffs not threatened with nor subject to application of Hawaii employment discrimination statute, chapter 378.  800 F. Supp. 882.

  Plaintiff had no standing to bring Truth in Lending Act claims unless plaintiff could show claims were exempt from bankruptcy estate or abandoned by bankruptcy trustee.  949 F. Supp. 1447.

  Requests for injunctive and declaratory relief rendered moot by the cessation of the disputed low-frequency active sonar research and the expiration of the subject permit.  14 F. Supp. 2d 1198.

  Plaintiff did not have standing to bring lawsuit, where plaintiff asserted mishandling of annual social security trust funds from 1960-1996, by improperly allowing social security trust funds to be spent for deficit reduction.  37 F. Supp. 2d 1176.

  Plaintiff was without standing, where plaintiff sought to enjoin State and city and county of Honolulu from implementation or enforcement of any and all state statutes and city ordinances that might apply to the business that plaintiff claimed to be developing, involving a commercial boating activity on the Ala Wai canal.  57 F. Supp. 2d 1028.

  Plaintiff, disabled individual who required a wheelchair to gain mobility, met constitutional minimum of Article III standing to seek injunctive relief for alleged Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 violations plaintiff encountered at fast food franchised restaurant and had standing to sue for injunctive relief for barriers not initially encountered; plaintiff's claims not specifically related to nonmobility denied due to lack of standing.  96 F. Supp. 2d 1065.

  Department of education's appeal of hearing officer's award of compensatory education moot; student had already received award of three months of compensatory education and had already graduated from high school.  127 F. Supp. 2d 1103.

  Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal of plaintiff's claim for compensatory education granted, where appeal of hearing officer's award moot; among other things, plaintiff had received a high school diploma.  127 F. Supp. 2d 1117.

  Defendants' issuance of supplemental environmental assessment for routine training at Makua Military Reservation and PFC Pililaau Range Complex (SEA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) constituted a final agency action ripe for judicial review at commencement of litigation under Administrative Procedure Act; plaintiff's claims had not been rendered moot by defendants' voluntary withdrawal of SEA and FONSI.  136 F. Supp. 2d 1155.

  Plaintiff challenging constitutionality of article XII of state constitution insofar as it created Hawaiian Homes Commission and office of Hawaiian affairs and established native Hawaiian gathering rights, lacked standing, where, inter alia, as to OHA's programs, plaintiff had not suffered injury-in-fact.  188 F. Supp. 2d 1219.

  Plaintiff challenging constitutionality of article XII, §§5 and 6 of state constitution and chapter 10, lacked standing, where plaintiff had not suffered any injury-in-fact.  188 F. Supp. 2d 1233.

  Where plaintiffs, seeking an order enjoining the executive director of the campaign spending commission, the commission, and the commissioners from taking any action adverse to plaintiffs, had not demonstrated a case or controversy for Article III purposes, court dismissed complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as moot.  199 F. Supp. 2d 1018.

  Plaintiffs alleging systemic harassment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth at a secure juvenile correctional facility, as well as differential treatment by staff and administrators, had standing to seek injunctive relief; one plaintiff's claims had become moot where there was no realistic possibility that the plaintiff would be returned to the facility.  415 F. Supp. 2d 1129.

  Plaintiff, a nonprofit health maintenance organization, satisfied Article III's case or controversy requirement; among other things, plaintiff alleged a concrete and particularized injury in its failure to obtain a contract under the QUEST expanded access program.  567 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (2008).

  Plaintiffs had standing to challenge §11-358 where each plaintiff had had a legitimate desire to make a contribution or contributions that would exceed the statutory limitations pursuant to §11-358 to a committee that made only independent expenditures; such a situation gave rise to an actual controversy. 744 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (2010).

  Claimant, as an unsecured creditor, did not have Article III standing to challenge the forfeiture of debtor's property, assuming that the defendant's money orders were purchased solely from the proceeds of the sale of debtor's property.  780 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (2011).

  Defendant insurance company's motion for judgment on the pleadings granted, inter alia, where insurance policy only covered some property in the individual units if the condo association agreement required the association of apartment owners (AOAO) to provide such insurance; policy did not state that the individual unit owners thereby became insureds who may bring claims against defendant on their own; that is, even if policy expanded what defendant covered for the AOAO, it did not necessarily follow that plaintiffs may themselves enforce the policy; in effect, plaintiffs had no standing to sue.  836 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (2011).

  Defendant insurance company's motion for judgment on the pleadings granted, inter alia, where the court was not persuaded that, by explicitly mentioning §514B-143(a)(1) while remaining silent as to §514B-143(b) in §514B-143(f), the legislature was giving a unit owner a private right of action under §514B-143(b); it could just as easily be said that the legislature's failure to mention any direct action by a unit owner indicated an intent not to permit such an action at all; in effect, plaintiffs had no standing to sue.  836 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (2011).

  Plaintiff physician, in plaintiff's individual capacity and in plaintiff's capacity as manager of defendant LLC, did not have standing to pursue claims on behalf of the other five physicians who were either equity members or employees of the LLC; a court may deny standing to a party because of prudential limitations on the standing doctrine which "include a requirement that the plaintiff assert [plaintiff's] own rights, rather than rely on the rights or interests of a third party".  861 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (2012).

  Plaintiff donors to political action committee had standing to challenge §11-358; they desired to and eventually made contributions that exceeded the statutory limitations, giving rise to an actual controversy; further, if §11-358 was constitutional as applied, they could have been subject to administrative fines or criminal prosecution; moreover, they indicated a legitimate desire to make similar contributions in 2012, and thus a favorable ruling would have allowed them to make further contributions in 2012 without violating the law.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  Plaintiff noncandidate committee and government contractor had standing to challenge the "advertising" disclaimer requirements in §11-391(a)(2)(B); first, even if plaintiff had already published advertisements with the disclaimers, it did not mean that it faced no injury; second, plaintiff sought a declaration that it need not include disclaimers in the future and challenged those statutes facially; third, plaintiff did not have to publish the advertisements without the disclaimers to have standing; finally, a favorable ruling would have enabled plaintiff to publish its advertisements without the disclaimers and fear of violating the law.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  Plaintiff noncandidate committee and government contractor had standing to challenge the contribution restrictions on government contractors in §11-355, given that plaintiff was a government contractor, had made substantial contributions to candidates in the past, and sought to make future contributions while it was a contractor; moreover, plaintiff did not have to violate the statute to challenge its terms, and a favorable ruling would have allowed plaintiff to make contributions as a contractor without violating the law.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  Plaintiff noncandidate committee and government contractor had standing to challenge the "noncandidate committee" and "expenditure" definitions in §11-302, where plaintiff had a good faith basis for believing it should not have to register as a noncandidate committee, giving rise to an actual controversy; if plaintiff ceased registration, but engaged in campaign related activities, it could have subjected itself to possible fines or actions; moreover, a favorable ruling would have allowed plaintiff to cease registration without violating the law.  872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (2012).

  Plaintiffs asserting that Hawaii's marriage laws were unconstitutional, had standing to seek relief from defendant governor; governor was a proper party in the case.  884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (2012).

  Plaintiff had not alleged an injury in fact, where plaintiff only alleged that plaintiff faced potential tax liability and penalties as a result of defendants' alleged violations of federal and state tax laws.  It was possible to cure the defects in the amended count by amendment, if plaintiff could allege that plaintiff faced actual or imminent tax liabilities or penalties as a result of defendant's alleged violations of federal and state tax laws.  23 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (2014).

  Where defendants asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a lawsuit because plaintiff was precluded from obtaining firearms under §134-7 and, therefore, could not establish a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights, police department's denial of plaintiff's application for a firearms permit, order to surrender firearms plaintiff possessed, and letter affirming the denial of the application, constituted an "injury-in-fact" sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of Article III standing.  49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).

  In 42 U.S.C. §1983 action, court concluded that there was standing for native Hawaiians and Hawaii residents of non-Hawaiian ancestry to challenge the constitutionality of state statutory restrictions on registering for a "roll" of qualified native Hawaiians and a nonprofit corporation's election of native Hawaiian delegates to a native Hawaiian convention to discuss, and possibly organize, a native Hawaiian governing entity.  Assuming that the nonprofit corporation was acting under the color of state law and held a public election, at least some plaintiffs would be deprived of the right to vote.  141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2015).

  In a class action brought against health care plan provider, where plaintiff had a contract with provider, in which provider agreed to reimburse non-contracted providers for services rendered to plaintiff, plaintiff had an expectation and a legal right that payment would be made on plaintiff's behalf, and provider's alleged denial constituted a concrete injury to plaintiff for purposes of establishing Article III standing.  Further, plaintiff was able to establish redressability because if the court adopted plaintiff's interpretation of the subject health plan, provider would be required to pay an outstanding balance for plaintiff's medical transport, thereby vindicating plaintiff's right to benefits.  Finally, in bringing this lawsuit, plaintiff satisfied the prudential standing requirement that plaintiff "assert his own legal rights and interests", rather than merely "the legal rights or interests of third parties".  221 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (2016).

  Although defendants, a lender, insurers, and insurance broker, argued that plaintiff, a reverse mortgage loan borrower, suffered no concrete and particularized injury when complaint was filed, plaintiff had standing to bring claims based upon lender-placed hurricane insurance and wrongful foreclosure of plaintiff's home; defendants failed to establish that borrower was made completely whole prior to the filing of complaint for all insurance and foreclosure-related premiums, expenses, and alleged damages.  308 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (2018).

  Where plaintiff claimed that defendant, a snack food manufacturer, misrepresented through deceptive advertising and labeling that its Hawaiian brand snacks originated from Hawaii, the court found that plaintiff adequately alleged that plaintiff faced an imminent or actual threat of future harm by being unable to rely on defendant's packaging and marketing and, thus, had standing to seek prospective injunctive relief.  390 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (2019).

  Plaintiff claimed that defendant, a snack food manufacturer, misrepresented through deceptive advertising and labeling that its Hawaiian brand snacks originated from Hawaii.  The court found that, because the packaging was sufficiently similar in all eight variations, plaintiff had standing to assert claims on behalf of unnamed class members as to the unpurchased Hawaiian snacks.  407 F. Supp. 3d 953 (2019).

  Employees' retirement system (ERS) trustees had standing as fiduciaries of the system and its members to challenge legislation that would impair the ERS where, because of the legislature's diversion of excess investment earnings to reduction of employer contributions, ERS had continued to suffer a large unfunded actuarial liability, at the very core of the dispute was the impact of Act 100, L 1999 on the viability of the system, and injunctive relief would provide assurance that the legislature would honor its representations that excess investment earnings would be retained by the ERS.  114 H. 302, 162 P.3d 696.

  Plaintiffs did not have standing where they failed to allege an "actual or threatened injury"; argument that impairing the employees' retirement system by removing "actuarial investment earnings in excess of a ten per cent investment yield rate" to be credited against employer contributions required for 1997 and 1998 would ultimately affect all members of the employees' retirement system was "abstract, conjectural, or merely hypothetical" with respect to each individual plaintiff.  114 H. 302, 162 P.3d 696.

  Plaintiffs, retired and current employees challenging the State's removal of excess earnings from the retirement system, did not have standing where they were unable to show that they had "not received any pension benefit to which he or she was entitled", nor were they able to show any "immediate threat that the pension fund would become insolvent".  114 H. 302, 162 P.3d 696.

  Plaintiff-county, acting on behalf of the county council, had standing to maintain action where it (1) sufficiently alleged a threatened injury--the usurpation of the county council's taxing authority, (2) the council's threatened injury was fairly traceable to the defendants' duty to enforce the charter amendment, and (3) a favorable decision of invalidating the charter amendment would likely have provided relief for the threatened injury.  115 H. 15, 165 P.3d 916.

  Where taxpayers failed to allege an injury-in-fact with regard to the Hawaiian homes commission act's native Hawaiian ancestry qualification for homestead leases, they did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the tax exemptions for homestead lessees or the Hawaiian homes commission act generally.  128 H. 89, 283 P.3d 695 (2011).

  Clause 2 did not grant original jurisdiction to U.S. Supreme Court in a case between a state and one of its own citizens; additionally, original jurisdiction did not lie in the U.S. Supreme Court because the instant case involved state penal statutes and was not civil in nature.  77 H. 222 (App.), 883 P.2d 644.

  Where plaintiff failed to demonstrate in plaintiff's complaint "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant plaintiff's invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on plaintiff's behalf," plaintiff lacked standing to challenge two city zoning and development ordinances.  96 H. 134 (App.), 28 P.3d 350.