§101-33  Allowance of interest, etc.  If an order is made letting the plaintiff into possession as provided for in sections 101-28, 101-29, and 101-32, the final judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation and damages awarded, interest at the rate provided in section 101-25 from the date of the order until paid by the plaintiff; provided that except in the case of an appeal by the plaintiff as provided in section 101-32, interest shall not be allowed upon any sum paid by the plaintiff to the clerk of the court from the date of the payment.  The court may fix and include in the order or judgment the time within which and the terms upon which the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff.  The court may make such orders in respect of encumbrances, liens, rentals, taxes, assessments, insurance, and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. [L 1896, c 45, pt of §16; RL 1925, pt of §825; RL 1935, pt of §68; am L 1937, c 184, pt of §5; RL 1945, §319, subs 3; am L 1951, c 12, pt of §1(l); RL 1955, §8-31; HRS §101-33]

Case Notes

  Section applied in computing rate of interest from order of possession to date of judgment.  45 H. 650, 372 P.2d 348.  Interest is allowable on amount stipulated as value.  48 H. 444, 404 P.2d 373.

  Blight of summons damages are computed at 5% interest rate (State v. Coney, 45 H. 650, overruled).  54 H. 385, 507 P.2d 1084.

  Blight of summons damages.  55 H. 226, 517 P.2d 7.

  Section does not authorize award of "interest on interest" or require that interest be awarded for periods where condemnation trial continued at landowner's request.  64 H. 168, 637 P.2d 1131.

  Where the plaintiff county of Kauai ("county") deposited estimated just compensation with the court following eminent domain proceedings, the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that the county's deposit was unconditional and stopped the running of interest as blight of summons damages.  The landowners were entitled to further blight of summons damages because the county's requirement of indemnification further delayed payment and constituted a condition placed upon the deposit of estimated just compensation.  137 H. 471 (App.), 375 P.3d 250 (2016).

  See 50 H. 237, 437 P.2d 321.

  Cited:  30 H. 1, 6; 36 H. 348, 351.