Civil liability for shoplifting, see §663A-2.

There was material difference between this section and theft indictment. 796 F.2d 261.

Evidence of recent and exclusive possession of stolen property if unexplained will sustain finding of guilt. 62 H. 83, 611 P.2d 595.

Particular ownership of property in question not essential element in proving crime. 65 H. 217, 649 P.2d 1138.

Receiving stolen property is a continuing offense. 65 H. 261, 650 P.2d 1358.

Section merely provides an alternate but not exclusive method establishing sufficient foundation for admissibility of photographs of stolen goods in shoplifting cases. 66 H. 97, 657 P.2d 1023.

Paragraph (6)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 78 H. 127, 890 P.2d 1167.

In order to convict a defendant of theft in the second degree, in violation of §708-831(1)(b) and paragraph (8)(a), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to steal property or services valued in excess of $300. 90 H. 359, 978 P.2d 797.

For purposes of paragraph (8)(a), "any store or retail establishment" constitutes a circumstance attendant to the charged conduct, and as such, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind as to that element. 101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517.

Inasmuch as the "intent to defraud" component of second degree theft by shoplifting, as defined by §708-800, prescribes two alternative means of establishing the state of mind requisite to the offense of second degree theft by shoplifting, trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct jury as to the alternative states of mind requisite to the charged offense. 101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517.

The alternative states of mind potentially requisite to the charged offense of second degree theft by shoplifting, as prescribed by the definition of "intent to defraud" set forth in §708-800, does not implicate a defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict, as guaranteed by article I, §§5 and 14 of the Hawaii constitution; a proper elements instruction, which sets forth the alternative states of mind prescribed by the "intent to defraud" component of second degree theft by shoplifting, does not violate defendant's constitutional right. 101 H. 389, 69 P.3d 517.

Phrase "whether from the property or its proceeds or from [the person's] own property reserved in equivalent amount" in paragraph (6)(a) limits application of paragraph to one of three situations specified in paragraph. 86 H. 183 (App.), 948 P.2d 604.

The law does not permit the conviction of a defendant of two counts of theft for, first, having obtained or taken an item of property and, second, for having disposed of or sold the same item of property; the taking and/or selling of one item of property is only one theft. 93 H. 22 (App.), 995 P.2d 323.

Where store security manager's testimony regarding the price/value of items, based on a universal price code with the price on the item that the manager verified through the store register system, was inadmissible hearsay, State failed to introduce substantial evidence of the value of the items necessary to support the charged offense of second or third degree theft; however, evidence was sufficient to support conviction of lesser included offense of fourth degree theft. 95 H. 169 (App.), 19 P.3d 752.