HRS 0706-0657 ANNOTATIONS

Act 271, Session Laws 1993, added this section to give discretion to the court to sentence an individual, in a second degree murder case evidencing exceptional depravity, to life imprisonment without possibility of parole under §706-656. The legislature felt that this discretion should be limited to those situations in which the circumstances demonstrate that the individual who committed the crime is exceptionally depraved, and therefore should receive the enhanced sentence. House Standing Committee Report No. 1171, Senate Standing Committee Report No. 689.

Act 15, Session Laws 1996, amended this section to provide that a court may sentence a person convicted of murder in the second degree to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, if the person had a prior conviction for murder. The Act addressed the problem encountered by the prosecution in Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442 (1993), in attempting to obtain a conviction of the defendant for murder in the first degree for killing two persons. The supreme court held in Briones v. State that the defendant must have had the prior intent or state of mind to kill two persons before the defendant killed the first person, for a conviction for murder in the first degree, which has a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The legislature's intent was to permit a court to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole when the defendant commits two or more murders. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 2592, House Standing Committee Report No. 221-96.

The findings necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under this section must be made by the trier of fact; if the prosecution elects to seek an enhanced sentence pursuant to this section, it must be alleged in the complaint. 92 H. 19, 986 P.2d 306.

Section requires State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim suffered unnecessary torture and that the defendant intentionally or knowingly inflicted unnecessary torture upon the victim; "unnecessary torture" means the infliction of extreme physical or mental suffering, beyond that which necessarily accompanies the underlying killing. 93 H. 224, 999 P.2d 230.

Trial court erred in imposing enhanced sentence under this section where court's findings of fact regarding whether victim screamed or incurred defensive wounds were clearly erroneous and there was no substantial evidence that victim suffered unnecessary torture. 93 H. 224, 999 P.2d 230.

Jury's findings whether murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity"; unanimity requirement clarified. 95 H. 1, 18 P.3d 203.

Section not unconstitutionally vague as section provides adequate guidance to a fact-finder charged with determining whether a murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" and provides adequate notice to the person of ordinary intelligence that an enhanced sentence may be imposed if he or she intentionally or knowingly inflicts unnecessary torture on the murder victim and the victim in fact suffers unnecessary torture. 95 H. 1, 18 P.3d 203.

Sentence for murder not an extended term. 6 H. App. 409, 723 P.2d 186.