This section restates prior law[1] and allows the court to increase or relax the conditions of probation. Such power is essential if the disposition is to remain flexible. However, if an increase in the severity of the conditions is proposed, the court must accord the defendant the procedural rights stated in §706-627.

Act 192, Session Laws 1985, amended this section and consolidated it with the law governing the revocation of probation or suspension of sentence, formerly contained in §706-628 and part of §706-627. As a result, §706-628 is repealed.

Act 45, Session Laws 1989, defined the word "conviction" as applied in the revocation or modification of probation conditions. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 1282, House Standing Committee Report No. 844.

Act 161, Session Laws 2002, amended this section to require the court not to revoke probation for the first violation of a nonviolent drug-related probation condition, and to require that the probation violators be sentenced to undergo and complete drug treatment instead of incarceration. The legislature found that the link between substance abuse and crime is well-established. The legislature did not wish to diminish the seriousness of crime, but looked to approaching crime as being the result of addiction that is treatable. The treatment route was expected to produce a reduction in crime and recidivism. The legislature intended to promote treatment of nonviolent substance abuse offenders, rather than incarceration, as being in the best interests of the individual and the community at large. Conference Committee Report No. 96-02.

Criteria for modification. 55 H. 632, 525 P.2d 1119.

Mandated revocation of probation under certain circumstances is a means to compel a court to review defendant's original sentence in light of new facts. Court may reimpose the same sentence. 69 H. 424, 744 P.2d 1208.

Defendant was prejudiced because of inability to independently test urine samples. 70 H. 194, 767 P.2d 243.

Court had discretion to consider factors other than defendant's wilfulness in determining whether failure to comply with probation condition was inexcusable under section. 73 H. 81, 829 P.2d 1325.

Statutory language of subsection (e) (1992) must be harmonized with §706-671(2), mandating credit for time served in imprisonment. 78 H. 343, 893 P.2d 194.

Court abused discretion in revoking defendant's probation where defendant made the monthly payments as condition of probation and there was no other justifiable cause for revocation. 79 H. 511, 904 P.2d 525.

Subsection (5), which permits a trial court on revocation of probation to impose any sentence that might have originally been imposed at the time of conviction, does not apply to the sentencing procedure attendant to revocation of a deferred acceptance of guilty plea, which is already specifically governed by §853-3. 93 H. 362, 3 P.3d 1239.

Court cannot revoke probation and impose new probation term. 6 H. App. 253, 718 P.2d 1117.

Where defendant made conscious and wilful decision to fail to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of probation under subsection (3), court did not abuse discretion in revoking probation and imposing sentence which may have been originally imposed. 82 H. 441 (App.), 922 P.2d 1054.

Circuit court properly concluded that it was required to revoke defendant's probation pursuant to subsection (c) because of subsequent felony conviction. 83 H. 102 (App.), 924 P.2d 596.

When defendant refused to admit having committed the sex crimes and failed to pass the lie detector tests, defendant did not "inexcusably" fail to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of the probation order under subsection (3) as the trial court could not order defendant to admit defendant's sex crimes and defendant did not personally expressly and explicitly agree to admit defendant's sex crimes and to accept probation on that basis. 93 H. 321 (App.), 2 P.3d 725.

Upon revocation of probation pursuant to subsection (3), in light of the record, §§706-660 and 706-621, trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to imprisonment "for a term of not more than ten years with credit for time served". 97 H. 135 (App.), 34 P.3d 1034.

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1. H.R.S. §711-77.