HRS 0834-0001 ANNOTATIONS

Re "due process" requirements for out-of-state transfers of prisoners. 387 F. Supp. 912; 396 F. Supp. 196.

Article VI tolling provision phrase "unable to stand trial" includes all periods of delay occasioned by defendant, including delays attributable to motions filed on defendant's behalf. 81 H. 123, 913 P.2d 49.

Neither Article III nor Article IV violated where 58 days had tolled because defendant, pursuant to Article VI, was "unable to stand trial" during pendency of defendant's motion to dismiss. 81 H. 123, 913 P.2d 49.

To comply with Article III prisoner's only responsibility is to file request for final disposition with official having custody. 4 H. App. 573, 670 P.2d 1290.

Defendant's right to speedy trial under this Agreement not violated where periods of delay that defendant was responsible for tolled 120-day period mandated by Article IV and brought trial commencement date within mandated period. 83 H. 496 (App.), 927 P.2d 1379.

Good cause did not exist under Agreement for continuance of trial where, despite defendant's persistent efforts to be tried within time limits and earlier trial date could have been assigned, motions court took "rather relaxed approach" in scheduling commencement of trial. 83 H. 496 (App.), 927 P.2d 1379.

Once time period within which defendant was required to be tried under this Agreement had lapsed, trial court lacked authority to retroactively grant continuance of defendant's trial. 83 H. 496 (App.), 927 P.2d 1379.

Where State was first to invoke provisions of this Agreement, defendant's right to a speedy trial under this Agreement was governed by Article IV, not Article III. 83 H. 496 (App.), 927 P.2d 1379.

After excluding forty days that defendant was unable to stand trial due to motions and continuances occasioned by defendant, trial court properly held defendant was brought to trial within 180-day speedy trial provision of this Agreement. 84 H. 191 (App.), 932 P.2d 328.

180-day time period for speedy trial under Article III(a) begins to run when prisoner's request for final disposition is actually delivered to prosecuting officer and court of receiving state, not when prisoner files request; no trial court error. 84 H. 191 (App.), 932 P.2d 328.

When a court grants a continuance for good cause in open court with defendant or defendant's counsel present as required under Article III(a), this Agreement does not require court to render formal determination that the speedy trial provision is tolled under Article VI(a). 84 H. 191 (App.), 932 P.2d 328.

Where defendant did not object to setting of trial date past the 180-day period required under this Agreement until after time period had run, defendant waived objection to this speedy trial provision. 84 H. 191 (App.), 932 P.2d 328.