HRS 0707-0701_0005 ANNOTATIONS

Directs the factfinder to first consider the elements of first degree murder. 71 H. 86, 784 P.2d 860.

Trial was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct. 71 H. 347, 791 P.2d 392.

Combination of acts of physical abuse and omissions to discharge parental duties and responsibilities, when coupled with requisite mental state, may rise to level of murder. 73 H. 236, 831 P.2d 924.

Where petitioner's convictions on counts I (attempted first degree murder), II (second degree murder), and III (attempted second degree murder) violated §701-109(1)(c)'s clear prohibition against inconsistent factual findings, the failure to raise this issue, both at trial and on appeal, resulted in withdrawal of not only a potentially meritorious defense, but a defense that would have altered the outcome. 74 H. 442, 848 P.2d 966.

Defendant charged with attempted murder, in violation of §705-500 and this section, may be convicted of attempted manslaughter, in violation of §§705-500 and 707-702(2). 80 H. 27, 904 P.2d 912.

The offense of use of a firearm in the commission of second degree murder in violation of §134-6(a) is not an included offense of second degree murder in violation of this section. 87 H. 1, 950 P.2d 1201.

As conviction for manslaughter due to an extreme mental or emotional disturbance under §707-702(2) is deemed an acquittal of murder, double jeopardy barred defendant's reprosecution for second degree murder under this section. 88 H. 356, 966 P.2d 1082.

Defendant's drug-induced mental illness was not a defense to second degree murder under subsection (1) as adoption of such a rule would be contrary to the statutory scheme and legislative intent of §§702-230 and 704-400. 93 H. 224, 999 P.2d 230.

Where evidence that child was a victim of battered child syndrome was relevant to show that child's death was not an accident, but the result of an intentional, knowing or reckless criminal act, giving rise to a duty on defendant's part to obtain medical care for child pursuant to §663-1.6, trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony that child was a victim of battered child syndrome. 101 H. 332, 68 P.3d 606.

Trial court reversibly erred when it gave flawed jury instruction on elements of murder in second degree, which led to improper closing argument by prosecutor, where defendants were charged with committing murder in second degree by voluntarily omitting to perform a duty imposed by law, more specifically, by omitting to perform their parental duty to provide timely medical care to son. 10 H. App. 43, 861 P.2d 24.

Under §701-109(4)(a) and (c), reckless endangering in the first degree under §707-713 is an included offense of attempted murder in the second degree under this section. 94 H. 513 (App.), 17 P.3d 862.

Where expert's testimony on the battered child syndrome was relevant to prove that the injuries to child were not accidental and that someone must have intended to harm child, trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting testimony. 101 H. 256 (App.), 66 P.3d 785.

Mentioned: 74 H. 197, 840 P.2d 374.