HRS 0291E-0041 ANNOTATIONS

Case Notes

Decisions under prior law (§286-261).

As section does not require defendant to submit to needs assessment nor undergo any treatment for alcohol dependence, application of section with DUI conviction under §291-4 not double jeopardy violation. 80 H. 8, 904 P.2d 893.

Section mandates that whenever license is administratively revoked under revocation program, offender shall be referred to certified substance abuse counselor for assessment. 80 H. 8, 904 P.2d 893.

Defendant not subjected to multiple punishments as a result of administrative driver's license revocation under this section and DUI conviction under §291-4 as administrative revocation non-punitive and purely remedial in nature. 81 H. 226, 915 P.2d 700.

Because counseling and assessment, as consequence of license revocation under subsection (d), not punitive but purely remedial, subsequent DUI conviction did not expose defendant to multiple "punishments"; defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds thus properly denied. 82 H. 446, 923 P.2d 388.

Director lacked discretion to impose any period of administrative revocation upon defendant other than "for life" where defendant was member of class of persons under subsection (b)(4) and written administrative record was not deficient in any respect. 84 H. 138, 931 P.2d 580.

The inherent power of the supreme court to make orders "for the promotion of justice" under §602-5(7) required that motorist be given an opportunity to challenge the lifetime revocation of motorist's license where one of the three predicate convictions on which revocation had been based had been set aside; motorist was thus entitled to have district court amend motorist's revocation period pursuant to this section upon the presentation of proof that motorist's driving record no longer supported the revocation period imposed. 94 H. 232, 11 P.3d 457.

The exclusionary rule in driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor cases where defendant was misinformed of the consequences of failing to take a chemical test applied retroactively. 96 H. 200, 29 P.3d 919.

The meaning of "prior alcohol enforcement contact" must be explained when advising a person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, of the potential length of license revocation for refusal to take a blood alcohol concentration test or for failing such a test, as set forth in this section, in order to ensure that the refusal of, or consent to, such a test is knowingly and intelligently made. 97 H. 463, 40 P.3d 865.

Arrestees who refuse to take a test for alcohol concentration are not subject to the administrative revocation period provided under subsection (b)(1) and, therefore, are not eligible for conditional driver's permits. 99 H. 70, 53 P.3d 209.

As administrative drivers license revocation office has no discretion regarding the revocation period for someone who refuses to take a breath or blood test, motorist was correctly informed of the consequences of refusal to take a breath or blood test. 94 H. 348 (App.), 14 P.3d 358.

 

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