HRS 0291E-0038 ANNOTATIONS

Whether appellant was ordered out or voluntarily exited appellant's vehicle, the officer's ensuing observations of appellant's physical condition were properly utilized by hearing officer to satisfy requirement of subsection (e)(2) that probable cause existed to believe that appellant drove while under the influence. 75 H. 1, 856 P.2d 1207.

When both subsections (d) and (g) are read together, it is clear that in addition to officers who are required to be subpoenaed, director may issue subpoenas to other officers or individuals; appellant's contention that subsection (g) limited director's subpoena power to those officials who submitted sworn statements was without merit. 75 H. 271, 859 P.2d 917.

Director's refusal to issue subpoena for the custodian of records of hospital was not an abuse of discretion; ADLRO's method of preparing hearing transcripts comported with subsection (h), and district court properly considered the transcripts. 76 H. 380, 878 P.2d 719.

Arrestee may be represented by counsel if arrestee chooses; however, no right to counsel as in the context of a criminal proceeding. 80 H. 197, 908 P.2d 545.

Section does not mandate continuance of hearing where retained counsel is unavailable; hearing officer has discretionary authority to grant or deny continuance for good cause; counsel's involvement in another trial is not per se good cause. 80 H. 197, 908 P.2d 545.

Hearing officer could conclude by preponderance of evidence, including margin of error for intoxilyzer test result, that it was more probable than not that respondent had blood alcohol content above legal limit. 83 H. 24, 924 P.2d 192.

Margin of error in intoxilyzer test result is a relevant factor to be weighed in considering evidence for driver license revocation. 83 H. 24, 924 P.2d 192.

Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office's practice of denying all prehearing subpoena requests for witnesses other than law enforcement officials submitting sworn statements does not violate an arrestee's right to due process. 88 H. 55, 961 P.2d 620.

Where hearing officer needed "more time" to make relevancy determination as to arrestee's requested witnesses, the continuance should have been designated a "director's continuance" pursuant to subsection (j). 88 H. 55, 961 P.2d 620.

Administrative driver's license revocation office did not abuse discretion by denying motorist's motion for continuance of the office's hearing pending district court's ruling on motorist's motion to set aside motorist's prior conviction where denying continuances based on speculation was consistent with the legislative intent behind the driver's license revocation statute and allowing continuances where the chances of overturning the prior conviction is speculative would encourage arrestees to exploit new dilatory tactics. 94 H. 232, 11 P.3d 457.

Due process right not violated by district court affirming administrative driver's license revocation office's denial of motorist's request for continuance of driver's license revocation hearing where administrative driver's license revocation office properly considered the evidence before it at the time of the administrative hearing and imposed the statutorily mandated revocation period. 94 H. 232, 11 P.3d 457.

The basis for driver's license revocation may be established in any one of three ways specified in subsection (e)(3) and §286-258(d)(3) and any one of the three bases for revocation is a sufficient and independent ground upon which to sustain revocation. 97 H. 463, 40 P.3d 865.

Director's violation of mandatory time requirements of section voided the administrative revocation of driver's license proceeding against petitioner. 9 H. App. 396, 843 P.2d 145.

Where there was no "hearing" within purview of subsection (h), there was no obligation to record proceedings. 10 H. App. 322, 871 P.2d 796.

At hearing held under this section, arrestee entitled to examine person offering reason for continuance on issue of whether there was good cause to continue administrative hearing pursuant to subsection (j). 80 H. 358 (App.), 910 P.2d 129.

Director's refusal to issue subpoenas to incident witnesses pursuant to this section abuse of discretion as witnesses possessed evidence relevant to question of arrestee's intoxication. 80 H. 358 (App.), 910 P.2d 129.

Arrestee did not have any constitutional right to call witnesses in order that arrestee wanted; subsection (d)(5) states that it is the hearing officer's prerogative to regulate the course and conduct of a hearing. 91 H. 212 (App.), 982 P.2d 346.

Based on §§286-257, 286-258, and this section, upon petitioner's objection, the hearing officer must exclude from the record only (a) all unsworn statements (except the arrest report) of law enforcement officials who do not appear to testify, and (b) all other evidence that is both irrelevant and prejudicial. 91 H. 212 (App.), 982 P.2d 346.

Where an arrestee's timely request for the issuance of a subpoena compelling the attendance of a witness at the first hearing states one or more facts showing that the witness is a relevant witness, the subpoena shall be issued prior to the first hearing. 91 H. 212 (App.), 982 P.2d 346.

Director, acting through an administrative driver's license revocation office hearing officer, abused director's discretion by continuing administrative hearing three separate times based solely on telephone messages that arresting police officer was "ill" and thus could not attend hearing. 93 H. 337 (App.), 3 P.3d 503.

Motorist denied due process and statutory rights to examine "a law enforcement official who made a sworn statement" where hearing officer received into evidence numerous documents, including arrest report of officer, but motorist was unable to question officer about officer's report and underlying arrest when hearing officer proceeded with hearing although officer was not present to testify. 93 H. 337 (App.), 3 P.3d 503.

Subsection (e) not applicable where officer never stopped motorist's vehicle; officer approached and talked to motorist only after motorist had first parked and exited motorist's vehicle, gone into a service station store to conduct some business, and thereafter exited the store. 93 H. 337 (App.), 3 P.3d 503.