HRS 0001-0014 ANNOTATIONS

Cited in construing "child". Att. Gen. Op. 93-1.

Presumption is that words used in usual sense. 25 H. 669, 686. 31 H. 625, 629, aff'd 52 F.2d 411; 41 H. 156, 159; 43 H. 154, 160; 44 H. 519, 530, 356 P.2d 1028; 46 H. 375, 399, 381 P.2d 687. But most known and usual sense may be repelled by the context, 25 H. 669, 686; 34 H. 269, 272, reh'g denied. 34 H. 324, aff'd 105 F.2d 286; or where would lead to absurdity or inconsistency, 43 H. 154, 157; 44 H. 220, 227, 352 P.2d 846; compare where strict construction called for. 22 H. 618, 625; 38 H. 421, 426; 44 H. 59, 67, 352 P.2d 335; 45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d 990.

Words of any statute, usually read in their ordinary and popular sense. 52 H. 279, 474 P.2d 538.

Usual meaning should be rejected if it results in absurdity. 55 H. 55, 515 P.2d 621.

Statute may be construed contrary to literal meaning where literal meaning results in absurdity and the words are susceptible of another construction carrying out the manifest intent. 57 H. 84, 549 P.2d 737.

There must be substantial justification for disregarding generally accepted meaning, but court must look to evils which provision expected to cure. 50 H. 212, 437 P.2d 99.

More natural interpretation may be rejected where would lead to unconstitutionality. 36 H. 170, 182; 40 H. 257, 259.

Where words are defined in statute express declaration of meaning governs. 15 H. 29, 34; 33 H. 371, 374; 36 H. 170, 178; 37 H. 314, 319, aff'd 174 F.2d 21; 37 H. 374, reh'g denied. 37 H. 380; 38 H. 16, 28; 49 H. 426, 421 P.2d 294; 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 664, 667. Certain terms defined for purposes of Hawaii Revised Statutes, see §§1-18 to 22.

While common meaning is general rule, where statute involves a trade presumption is that words have trade meaning. 45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d 990.

Modern meaning given, as distinguished from ancient restricted meaning. 34 H. 245. Commonly accepted meaning, as distinguished from fine distinctions of law of future interests. 46 H. 375, 381 P.2d 687.

Where statute does not refer to renewal of a license and treats all licenses as similar whether first or subsequent, circumstance that in popular mind there is a difference not sufficient to alter plain meaning. 12 H. 303, 306.

Other cases where usual sense given or statute cited: 3 H. 793; 5 H. 321; 8 H. 259; 25 H. 747, 754; 39 H. 100, 109.

Whatever is necessarily or plainly implied is as much a part of the statute as that which is expressed. 58 H. 53, 564 P.2d 436.

Courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute if such a construction can legitimately be found. 60 H. 487, 591 P.2d 607.

Cited in construing "accident." 1 H. App. 625, 623 P.2d 1271.

Mentioned: 9 H. App. 325, 839 P.2d 530.