USCON AM-0005- ANNOTATIONS

Section 486H-10 prohibiting manufacturers and jobbers of petroleum products from operating a retail service station for retail sale of petroleum products did not violate eminent domain clause of federal constitution. Att. Gen. Op. 95-4.

Student regulations at state universities are subject to the vagueness standard but do not require the same specificity required of criminal statutes. Att. Gen. Op. 71-9.

Suppression of Evidence Without the Aid of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 8 HBJ 109.

Included Offenses in Hawaii Case Law and the Rights to Trial by Jury: Coherence or Confusion. II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 77.

Fitness to Proceed: Compassion or Prejudice? II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 135.

Hawaii's Noncommitment to Civil Commitment: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of Theory. 13 HBJ No. 4 Winter 1978, pg. 40.

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Hawaii: One of These Things is Not Like The Other. III HBJ No. 13, at pg. 1.

Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis. 13 UH L. Rev. 1.

The Hostile Work Environment: Are Federal Remedies Hostile, Too? 13 UH L. Rev. 537.

The Lum Court, Land Use, and the Environment: A Survey of Hawai`i Case Law 1983 to 1991. 14 UH L. Rev. 119.

Administering Justice or Just Administration: The Hawaii Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals. 14 UH L. Rev. 271.

The Protection of Individual Rights Under Hawai`i's Constitution. 14 UH L. Rev. 311.

The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands. 14 UH L. Rev. 445.

Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S. Citizens in the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 15 UH L. Rev. 61.

Even a War Has Some Rules: The Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on Drug-Related Civil Forfeitures. 16 UH L. Rev. 493.

The Reassertion of Native Hawaiian Gathering Rights Within The Context of Hawai`i's Western System of Land Tenure. 17 UH L. Rev. 165.

Dolan v. City of Tigard: Individual Property Rights v. Land Management Systems. 17 UH L. Rev. 193.

State v. Lessary: The Hawaii Supreme Court's Contribution to Double Jeopardy Law. 17 UH L. Rev. 269.

A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism: Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process. 18 UH L. Rev. 571.

Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992. 18 UH L. Rev. 683.

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena: A Color-blind Remedy Eliminating Racial Preferences. 18 UH L. Rev. 939.

A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability. 19 UH L. Rev. 93.

An Evaluation of the Summary Contempt Power of the Court: Balancing the Attorney's Role as an Advocate and the Court's Need for Order. 19 UH L. Rev. 145.

Hawai`i Constitution, Article XI, Section 1: The Conservation, Protection, and Use of Natural Resources. 19 UH L. Rev. 177.

Babbitt v. Youpee: Allotment and the Continuing Loss of Native American Property and Rights to Devise. 19 UH L. Rev. 265.

The Manoa Valley Special District Ordinance: Community-Based Planning in the Post-Lucas Era. 19 UH L. Rev. 449.

The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective. 19 UH L. Rev. 649.

Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the Debate on Native American and Hawaiian "Cultural Property" Repatriation. 20 UH L. Rev. 261.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg And Gender Discrimination. 20 UH L. Rev. 699.

The Jurisdictional Limits of Federal Criminal Child Pornography Law. 21 UH L. Rev. 73.

A New Segregation? Race, Rice v. Cayetano, and the Constitutionality of Hawaiian-Only Education and the Kamehameha Schools. 23 UH L. Rev. 109.

IOLTA in the New Millenium: Slowly Sinking Under the Weight of the Takings Clause. 23 UH L. Rev. 221.

"If a Policeman Must Know the Constitution, Then Why Not a Planner?" A Constitutional Challenge of the Hawai`i Public Access Statute. 23 UH L. Rev. 409.

Right Against Self-Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawai`i's Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the Fifth Amendment? 23 UH L. Rev. 825.

Is Agricultural Land in Hawai`i "Ripe" for a Takings Analysis? 24 UH L. Rev. 121.

Lucas Takings: Why Investment-Backed Expectations are Irrelevant when Applying the Categorical Rule. 24 UH L. Rev. 147.

The Defense of Marriage Act: Sex and the Citizen. 24 UH L. Rev. 279.

Takings: An Introduction and Overview. 24 UH L. Rev. 441.

Transcript of the University of Hawai`i Law Review Symposium: Property Rights After Palazzolo. 24 UH L. Rev. 455.

The Latest Take on Background Principles and the States' Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo. 24 UH L. Rev. 497.

The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule. 24 UH L. Rev. 533.

Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis. 24 UH L. Rev. 589.

Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A Procedural Loose End. 24 UH L. Rev. 623.

Exhibition of individual to jury in criminal prosecution not per se improper. 81 H. 15, 911 P.2d 735.

Indictment dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct. 607 F.2d 871.

Government did not constructively amend appellant's indictment, where appellant contended that grand jury indicted appellant for a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in Hawaii but proof at trial failed to connect appellant to Hawaii. 255 F.3d 714.

Indictment not affected by examination of defendant's wife by grand jury. 45 H. 221, 365 P.2d 202.

Indictment not affected by noncompliance with statutory or criminal rule provisions relating to preliminary examination. 45 H. 604, 372 P.2d 356.

Preliminary hearing is not a constitutional requirement and not a prerequisite to issuance of indictment. 51 H. 318, 459 P.2d 376.

Prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury must be extreme and clearly infringe upon jury's decision-making function in order to serve as basis for quashing indictment. 62 H. 209, 614 P.2d 373.

Hearsay admissible if not deliberately used in place of better evidence to improve case for indictment. 62 H. 518, 616 P.2d 1383.

Prosecutor was not required to instruct grand jury on option to indict for lesser offense unless evidence clearly establish lesser offense. 62 H. 518, 616 P.2d 1383.

Mere absence of independent grand jury counsel does not establish that the due process rights of accused were violated. 63 H. 412, 629 P.2d 1111; 63 H. 633, 633 P.2d 1113.

Evidence established probable cause that defendant was driving under influence of drugs. 68 H. 184, 706 P.2d 1305.

Section 485-21 provides an essential element of offense charged, when a defendant is charged with a criminal violation of Uniform Securities Act; counts of indictment, which cited to §485-21, were insufficient, as counts did not include essential elements of offenses charged. 78 H. 373, 894 P.2d 70.

Although prosecution's oral charge failed to include the word "bodily" to modify "injury", the omission did not alter the nature and cause of the accusation such that a person of common understanding would fail to comprehend it; thus, the oral charge was not so obviously defective that by no reasonable construction could it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had; because omission of the word "bodily" did not constitute an essential element of the offense, harmless error. 99 H. 312, 55 P.3d 276.

Exclusionary rule not applicable where Miranda rights violated by foreign police in foreign country even though in violation of foreign law. 783 F.2d 1052.

Defendant's second statement was voluntary even though it followed a previous unwarned admission. 889 F.2d 819.

Where M.P.s allowed defendant to consume beer there was no coercion and defendants' statements were voluntary. 666 F. Supp. 1421.

Miranda warnings not required where defendant was not in custody at the time of hospital bedside discussion. 800 F. Supp. 892.

Although Miranda warnings properly given, where government fails to prove accuracy of defendant's written statement due to defendant's limited understanding of English, statement inadmissible. 803 F. Supp. 352.

Defendant's waivers of defendant's Miranda rights at time of defendant's arrest and before defendant's first interview were valid; defendant's statements made after defendant made request for attorney to Canadian law enforcement officer suppressed. 888 F. Supp. 1521.

Upon new trial after reversal, doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, applicable, even though statements taken, and first trial held before Miranda. 49 H. 504, 506, note 3, 421 P.2d 305.

Doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, inapplicable to defendant tried before that case decided. 49 H. 522, 532, 423 P.2d 438. Where Miranda inapplicable, question is whether confession was given "freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences." 50 H. 42, 430 P.2d 330.

Confession obtained while defendant in custody after being retaken following an escape not voluntary when defendant previously had been found by a psychiatric commission to be suffering from a major mental illness, and upon consideration of other circumstances. 50 H. 42, 430 P.2d 330.

Waiver of constitutional protection. 51 H. 260, 457 P.2d 505.

In application of Miranda, the test is whether the words used give a clear, understandable warning of accused's rights. 56 H. 428, 539 P.2d 1200.

Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation. 58 H. 94, 564 P.2d 1271; 61 H. 124, 596 P.2d 777.

Voluntary statement that didn't result from custodial interrogation is not restricted by Miranda. 58 H. 323, 568 P.2d 1200; 66 H. 499, 666 P.2d 592.

Custodial interrogation. 59 H. 357, 581 P.2d 752; 64 H. 479, 643 P.2d 541; 67 H. 126, 681 P.2d 553.

Without Miranda warnings, statements made during custodial interrogation must be excluded although they may be wholly voluntary; volunteered confession independent of interrogation is outside of Miranda rule. 61 H. 356, 604 P.2d 45.

Defendant not entitled to Miranda warnings before being questioned by probation officer. 61 H. 571, 606 P.2d 1332.

Circumstances indicate that interrogation was not custodial interrogation. 62 H. 259, 614 P.2d 386; 2 H. App. 462, 634 P.2d 421.

Roadside questioning to obtain information to issue traffic citation not a "custodial interrogation". 68 H. 184, 706 P.2d 1305.

Miranda rights violated where defendant was questioned after polygraph examination. 70 H. 351, 772 P.2d 113.

No custodial interrogation prior to arrest where police officer lacking probable cause to arrest temporarily detained defendant for on-the-scene questioning in open view. 73 H. 41, 828 P.2d 805.

Right to remain silent waived where defendant, after being properly given Miranda warnings and additionally being told that everything defendant said was "on the record", initiated dialogue with officer. 80 H. 439, 911 P.2d 74.

Defendant's response to police matron's question during strip search was inadmissible, absent Miranda warnings. 1 H. App. 430, 620 P.2d 263.

Validity of waiver of rights; standard of review. 1 H. App. 625, 623 P.2d 1271.

No right to suppress unsolicited, spontaneous, and voluntary statements made while in custody. 3 H. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807.

Confession not tainted by earlier confession which had been obtained illegally. 4 H. App. 248, 665 P.2d 181.

Question to defendant "do you know why you are being detained?" was interrogation because officer should have known that it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from defendant. 85 H. 171 (App.), 938 P.2d 1190.

See also notes on defendant's out-of-court statements.

State involuntary commitment statute does not violate privilege by penalizing refusal to speak. 617 F.2d 173.

Prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where silence not probative and where prejudice to defendant might result. 639 F.2d 466.

No abuse of discretion in allowing witness broad privilege to refuse to answer all substantive questions. 646 F.2d 365.

Prosecutor's comments not improper comment upon defendant's failure to testify. 730 F.2d 1292.

Not violated by requirement that passenger notify carrier of firearm shipment. 777 F.2d 494.

Prosecutor improperly commented on defendant's failure to testify. 807 F.2d 805.

Defendant's exercise of right to appeal or privilege against self-incrimination cannot be used as basis for denying reduction of offense level under sentencing guidelines for acceptance of responsibility. 998 F.2d 1460.

Where defendant contended that pursuant to constitutional right to testify, district court was required to permit defendant to explain to jury that defendant behaved in manner that defendant did because defendant was acting under duress, whether or not defendant had demonstrated prima facie evidence of duress, since proposed testimony pertained to a defense that was not relevant as a matter of law, the district court did not err in excluding the evidence during the trial. 102 F.3d 994.

Requiring inmates labeled as sex offenders to admit their offenses and take responsibility for their sexual behaviors as part of treatment program did not violate privilege against self-incrimination. 131 F.3d 818.

Prosecutor's prejudicial references to defendant's privilege against self-incrimination made during grand jury hearing are grounds for dismissal of indictment. 450 F. Supp. 1097.

Prosecutor's comments in regard to defendant's failure to testify were prejudicial. 674 F. Supp. 788.

Where after never asserting the privilege, petitioner argued that petitioner failed to file a bond and contest the administrative forfeiture because the acts would incriminate petitioner, because the self-incrimination dilemmas never materialized and the remedy sought was well beyond those provided for such dilemmas, petitioner's argument concerning self-incrimination found without merit. 887 F. Supp. 1371.

Defendant was not in custody for either of two conversations, where defendant had freedom to move anywhere on island when both conversations occurred; consequently, Miranda warnings not required and defendant's right not to incriminate defendant not violated. 961 F. Supp. 1398.

Claim of privilege against self-incrimination by minor under 18 cannot be supported on the basis of possible juvenile court proceedings against minor, nor on the basis of possible prosecution for misdemeanor where the statute of limitations will run before the minor reaches 18. 44 H. 271, 353 P.2d 631.

Right against self-incrimination being personal to witness, defendants cannot object to court's failure to warn witness. 51 H. 40, 450 P.2d 996.

Comment on defendant's assertion of right against self-incrimination in civil proceeding is not permissible. 51 H. 649, 466 P.2d 452.

Statute cannot destroy one's right to silence by empowering police and judiciary to compel communication, nor may statute impose criminal liability for failing to speak. 52 H. 527, 480 P.2d 148.

Comment on defendant's silence not automatic grounds for reversal. Standard. 63 H. 488, 630 P.2d 619.

Not violated by requirement to undergo field sobriety test. Roadside questioning of defendant after stop for traffic violation not a custodial interrogation. 67 H. 293, 687 P.2d 544.

Officer's remarks intended as greeting, not an interrogation. Confession was unsolicited, spontaneous statement. 67 H. 563, 698 P.2d 281.

Presentation to defendant of apparently overwhelming inculpatory evidence was an interrogation; right to remain silent violated where functional equivalent of interrogation begun immediately after right exercised. 68 H. 28, 702 P.2d 1352.

Privilege does not extend to defendant implicated by another whose right against self-incrimination was violated. 68 H. 569, 722 P.2d 1036.

Default judgment for failure to make an accounting did not violate privilege where no evidence that information sought by accounting would incriminate defendant. 68 H. 608, 726 P.2d 254.

Miranda warnings for one offense provide sufficient notice as to potential criminal liability for another offense. 69 H. 398, 744 P.2d 514.

Scope of protections guaranteed by Hawaii constitution are broader than federal requirements. 69 H. 461, 748 P.2d 365.

Defendant's statement to police, made while wearing blanket during custodial interrogation, was not coerced under totality of circumstances. 72 H. 327, 817 P.2d 1054.

Constitutional right was not voluntarily waived by defendant's confession to theft where waiver was predicated on prior illegal search and State failed to meet burden of showing that taint of illegal search had been dissipated or that there was an independent source inducing defendant to waive right. 72 H. 505, 824 P.2d 833.

Not violated where court requested defendant to identify self for purposes of identification in compliance with Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure 43(a) (requiring presence of defendant at trial). 72 H. 573, 827 P.2d 648.

Defendant's mental and physical condition at time of defendant's interview with detective did not render defendant's statement involuntary; where defendant complained detective repeatedly exhorted defendant to tell the whole story and wheedled a confession out of defendant through misrepresentations, detective's tactics did not amount to mental or psychological coercion, rendering defendant's consequent statement involuntary and inadmissible. 74 H. 479, 849 P.2d 58.

Circuit court's error in failing to expressly state findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to alleged violation of appellant's right against self-incrimination was harmless error; reversal of appellant's original conviction was not based on prosecution's use of illegally obtained confessions and appellant had never alleged that appellant was in any way compelled to testify at first trial. 76 H. 237, 873 P.2d 775.

Defendant did not invoke right where, after being properly informed of Fifth Amendment rights, record did not support conclusion that defendant did request attorney during first police interview and defendant admitted to failing to request attorney at last two interviews. 83 H. 443, 927 P.2d 844.

Right voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived where no one threatened defendant to sign police waiver forms or during subsequent interviews, defendant knew defendant could terminate interviews at any time, and defendant was not a "neophyte" to criminal justice system. 83 H. 443, 927 P.2d 844.

Where Miranda warnings not first given to defendant in custody, defendant's statements to officer regarding device found in defendant's truck and device's purpose were unlawfully obtained and thus inadmissible. 87 H. 71, 951 P.2d 934.

Where "public safety" exception to Miranda inapplicable to case, statements by defendant subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings inadmissible in evidence. 87 H. 71, 951 P.2d 934.

A trial court must pass on a defendant's attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach", whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where defendant did not meet burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for withdrawal of defendant's prior waiver of defendant's right to testify, defendant failed to present "fair and just reasons" for defendant's request to exercise defendant's right to testify in defendant's own behalf; thus trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that it would not reopen case. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where trial court's denial of defendant's post-verdict motion for a new trial -- based on defendant's claim that defendant's attempt to withdraw defendant's waiver of right to testify in defendant's own behalf should have been allowed -- was not "manifestly unjust", no abuse of discretion. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where defendant initiated contact with police for purpose of making a confession and police adequately determined that defendant's mind was clear and defendant had made a voluntary decision to waive defendant's rights and make a statement, trial court properly determined defendant knowingly and intelligently waived constitutional rights. 92 H. 19, 986 P.2d 306.

Where no evidence that defendant felt compelled to give statement to police because defendant feared defendant would be beaten, felt dizzy and in pain, and had not slept in four days prior to defendant's arrest, trial court erred in concluding statement was not voluntarily and freely given. 92 H. 135, 988 P.2d 200.

Where trial court was put on advance notice that defendant intended to invoke privilege against self-incrimination, court abused discretion by permitting prosecution to question defendant about false identification cards; risk of unfair prejudice occasioned by compelling criminal defendant to invoke privilege in front of jurors was substantial and not outweighed by probative value of prosecution's unanswered questions. 97 H. 206, 35 P.3d 233.

Defendant's constitutional and statutory right to testify in defendant's own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant's attorney's advice and thus refrain from testifying, and the violation was plain error; denial of the right to testify was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

Prosecutor's statements not improper comment upon defendant's failure to testify. 3 H. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807.

Defendant's right to testify in defendant's own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant's attorney's advice and thus refrain from testifying. 78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

Because defendant's refusal to take the field sobriety test was neither testimonial nor compelled, this Amendment and article I, §10 of the Hawaii constitution were not offended. 94 H. 17 (App.), 7 P.3d 193.

Where detective made clear to defendant that "in accordance with the mandate of Miranda, the right to counsel may be invoked at any point, and when invoked, all substantive questioning must cease unless and until counsel is provided," trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress statement defendant made to detective. 101 H. 97 (App.), 63 P.3d 405.

Where defendant was properly informed of defendant's Miranda rights against self-incrimination, and expressly waived this right and the right to counsel prior to being examined and prior to giving the suppressed statements, defendant's rights not violated. 101 H. 344 (App.), 68 P.3d 618.

Essence of double jeopardy determination in conspiracy case is whether there is more than one agreement. 681 F.2d 581.

Convictions for possession of unregistered firearms and possession of firearms by a felon not violative. 682 F.2d 799.

Due diligence did not require extraordinary search methods at remote site, based on facts known at that time; greater charges not prohibited if government was unable to prosecute at outset because facts were not discovered despite exercise of due diligence. 707 F.2d 1100.

No jeopardy attached where at pretrial hearing defendant acquitted by trial court by reason of insanity. 794 F.2d 1458.

Remand for resentencing of an illegal sentence did not constitute double jeopardy. 876 F.2d 734.

No double jeopardy where government appeals a reversal of defendant's conviction. 910 F.2d 617.

Increasing sentence of defendant due to firearm possession while in possession of drugs was not double jeopardy. 924 F.2d 800.

Murder defendant's fourth trial not barred by double jeopardy clause based on contention that prosecutorial misconduct intended to goad defendant into moving for mistrial. 937 F.2d 1409.

Civil penalty imposed for failure to disclose marijuana pursuant to U.S. customs directive was not punishment for purposes of double jeopardy which would bar subsequent criminal prosecution for knowing possession and importation of marijuana. 940 F.2d 442.

Double jeopardy claim failed where appellants failed to show that two conspiracies were the same in law and in fact. 995 F.2d 1448.

Although double jeopardy clause embraces a defendant's right to have bench trial completed by a particular judge, a defendant moving for a mistrial can be retried. 446 F. Supp. 1120.

When judge declares mistrial sua sponte over defendant's objections, determination whether there was valid reason for ending trial is governed by manifest necessity test. No manifest necessity to terminate first trial. 528 F. Supp. 833.

Prosecution not barred because due diligence exception applied. Due diligence means ordinary rather than extraordinary diligence. 546 F. Supp. 805.

Uncontested administrative forfeiture did not offend the double jeopardy clause. Because defendant chose to forego opportunity to contest forfeiture, defendant was not a party to forfeiture proceeding and could not claim an interest in the property; without an interest in the property, defendant could not be said to have been subjected to jeopardy or punished in any way by the administrative forfeiture. 876 F. Supp. 235.

Where plaintiff was subjected to two separate proceedings, i.e., separation proceedings after plaintiff was found not guilty of use of cocaine by military judge in special court martial, question of whether the separation proceedings were sufficiently punitive to implicate double jeopardy was a serious constitutional question, justifying an exception from the exhaustion requirement for the limited purpose of the temporary restraining order and a finding of a serious question on the merits. 877 F. Supp. 508.

Uncontested administrative forfeiture did not punish petitioner or place petitioner in jeopardy in the sense necessary to trigger double jeopardy clause protection. 887 F. Supp. 1371.

Trial court's decision to declare mistrial was proper exercise of its discretion; accordingly, even if juror misconduct was not certain to result in reversal, defendants' joint motion to dismiss indictment on double jeopardy grounds must be denied. 951 F. Supp. 928.

Double jeopardy clause not violated by a retrial, where jury was unable to reach a verdict. 952 F. Supp. 1426.

Former prosecution bar to subsequent prosecution, when. 52 H. 321, 474 P.2d 704.

Effects of setting aside former convictions by granting coram nobis and habeas corpus. 52 H. 420, 477 P.2d 630.

Declaration of mistrial--when a bar to retrial. 58 H. 377, 569 P.2d 900; 62 H. 108, 612 P.2d 107.

Resentencing to correct illegal sentence does not violate double jeopardy clause even if correction increases sentence. 61 H. 226, 602 P.2d 13; 67 H. 531, 696 P.2d 344.

Where first indictment was void, no jury was impanelled, and judge heard no evidence on the charge, jeopardy did not attach. 62 H. 364, 616 P.2d 193.

Under circumstances, jeopardy did not attach even though jury was sworn. 64 H. 395, 641 P.2d 1338.

Rights waived by defendant. 64 H. 611, 645 P.2d 1340.

Dismissal of prosecution not required. 65 H. 47, 647 P.2d 705; 65 H. 129, 648 P.2d 192.

No jeopardy attached where at pretrial hearing defendant acquitted by trial court by reason of insanity. 67 H. 70, 679 P.2d 615.

Jeopardy did not attach where case dismissed after defendant arraigned but before State's first witness sworn. 68 H. 238, 709 P.2d 607.

No double jeopardy where crimes charged involved different mens rea requirements and different facts proved each crime. 68 H. 280, 711 P.2d 731.

No double jeopardy where trial court did not accept verdict or discharge the jury. 70 H. 175, 765 P.2d 1091.

Retrial not barred by double jeopardy clause where there was no prosecutorial intent to goad defendant into moving for mistrial. 73 H. 289, 834 P.2d 275.

Reprosecution barred because defendant was subjected to former jeopardy in first trial and trial court erroneously declared mistrial without defendant's consent or a showing of manifest necessity. 75 H. 195, 857 P.2d 585.

Hawaii constitution provides greater protection against multiple prosecutions than U.S. Constitution; requires application of "same conduct" test. 75 H. 446, 865 P.2d 150.

One year suspension of appellant's license to practice medicine by board of medical examiners after appellant was convicted of attempted first degree sexual abuse and kidnapping did not amount to a violation of double jeopardy clause. 78 H. 21, 889 P.2d 705.

Appellant's new sentence did not contravene right against double jeopardy even if it potentially affected appellant's future eligibility for parole. 79 H. 281, 901 P.2d 481.

Reprosecution not barred by double jeopardy where trial court's declaration of mistrial supported by manifest necessity; court sufficiently considered alternatives available. 79 H. 461, 903 P.2d 1282.

As §286-261(d) did not require defendant to submit to needs assessment nor undergo any treatment for alcohol dependence, application of that section with DUI conviction under §291-4 not "multiple punishments for same offense". 80 H. 8, 904 P.2d 893.

Remanding case for retrial on lesser included offenses following appellate determination that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support conviction of greater offense did not violate clause. 80 H. 126, 906 P.2d 612.

Defendant not subjected to multiple punishments as a result of administrative driver's license revocation under §286-261 and DUI conviction under §291-4 as administrative revocation non-punitive and purely remedial in nature. 81 H. 226, 915 P.2d 700.

Because counseling and assessment, as consequence of administrative driver's license revocation under §286-261(d), not punitive but purely remedial, subsequent DUI conviction did not expose defendant to multiple "punishments"; defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds thus properly denied. 82 H. 446, 923 P.2d 388.

Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, premised on protection against multiple punishments for same offense, not effectively unreviewable on appeal and thus not immediately appealable under collateral order exception. 82 H. 446, 923 P.2d 388.

Jeopardy did not attach where defendant failed to file a timely claim for forfeited property under §712A-10(4). 83 H. 141, 925 P.2d 311.

Where defendant's conviction on non-existent attempted reckless manslaughter charge vacated, remand for retrial on original charge of attempted first degree murder unconstitutional and also violation of §701-110(1). 83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258.

Not violated by prosecution's appeal from judgment of acquittal following jury's verdict of guilty pursuant to §641-13(9). 87 H. 108, 952 P.2d 865.

As conviction for manslaughter due to an extreme mental or emotional disturbance under §707-702(2) is deemed an acquittal of murder, double jeopardy barred defendant's reprosecution for second degree murder under §707-701.5. 88 H. 356, 966 P.2d 1082.

Prosecution not barred from reprosecuting defendant for offense of reckless manslaughter under §707-702(1)(a) as reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder and remanding a case for retrial on lesser included offenses not barred by double jeopardy. 88 H. 356, 966 P.2d 1082.

Where, upon defendant's own motion, place to keep firearms count under §134-6 was dismissed on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, retrial on the place to keep firearms charge not barred by double jeopardy clauses of U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions. 88 H. 389, 967 P.2d 221.

As family court's "judgment of acquittal" was, in fact, an acquittal "in substance as well as form", clause violated where family court granted prosecution's motion for reconsideration and denied defendant's motion to dismiss complaint. 91 H. 206, 982 P.2d 340.

Given that any improper remarks in opening statement, closing and rebuttal arguments by prosecutor were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and their cumulative effect was similarly harmless and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, prosecutor's misconduct did not warrant reversal of any of defendant's convictions and did not implicate the double jeopardy clauses of either the U.S. or Hawaii Constitutions. 95 H. 465, 24 P.3d 661.

Trial court abused its discretion in concluding there was manifest necessity for mistrial as circumstances creating apparent need for mistrial did not make it impossible for trial to proceed; in absence of manifest necessity, defendant should have been allowed to choose between continuing with trial or consenting to a mistrial; by moving for dismissal with prejudice, defendant did not "consent" to the mistrial; retrial thus barred by double jeopardy. 97 H. 238, 35 P.3d 755.

Does not bar second trial of charge dismissed before being submitted to judge or jury. 5 H. App. 127, 681 P.2d 573.

Retrial permissible if dismissal due solely to trial error rather than evidentiary insufficiency; jeopardy ended at trial where judge did not return verdict on charge despite having full opportunity to do so and no extraordinary circumstances. 7 H. App. 48, 744 P.2d 783.

No double jeopardy for conviction under §§707-734 and 712-1217. 8 H. App. 535, 813 P.2d 335.

Retrial barred where reversal of DUI conviction based on improperly admitted test result from breath-testing instrument was for insufficiency of evidence, not trial error. 9 H. App. 130, 828 P.2d 813.

Retrial not barred where defendant moved for dismissal and was successful in having the charge dismissed before a determination was made of whether defendant was guilty or not guilty and where defendant did not make any showing that prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial. 10 H. App. 491, 878 P.2d 739.

Clause violated where defendant, upon being resentenced for same offense, not given credit for imprisonment already served and fines already paid. 82 H. 83 (App.), 919 P.2d 995.

Since kidnapping under §707-720(d) and sexual assault under §707-732(1)(e) require proof of a fact which the other does not, offenses are different and defendant's federal double jeopardy guarantee not violated by defendant's conviction and punishment for both offenses. 85 H. 92 (App.), 937 P.2d 933.

Where purported judgment of acquittal was unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of defendant and was solely based on a question of law, no double jeopardy if defendant retried. 88 H. 477 (App.), 967 P.2d 674.

Retrial of defendant was not double jeopardy and not barred when mistrial was prompted by prosecutorial misconduct, even where the defendant consented to the mistrial, where the prosecutorial misconduct was not so egregious that, from an objective standpoint, it clearly denied the defendant his or her right to a fair trial. 97 H. 166 (App.), 34 P.3d 1065.

Discussed. 55 H. 14, 514, P.2d 580.

"Public use" requirement is coterminous with scope of sovereign's police powers. Land reform act was rational use of eminent domain power. 467 U.S. 229.

If fear of a hazard would affect price a knowledgeable and prudent buyer would pay to a similarly well-informed seller, diminution in value caused by that fear may be recoverable as party of just compensation. Severance damages not allowed because no prima facie case of causation. 731 F.2d 1443.

Public access to lagoon formed from littoral Hawaiian fishpond could not be imposed without payment of compensation. 944 F.2d 1489.

Courts are not immune from prohibition against taking without compensation. 402 F. Supp. 95.

"Public use" includes "public interest." 471 F. Supp. 871.

Given system of landholding in Hawaii, legislature could, under police power, conclude that general welfare was served by condemning land of large landholder-lessors and allow lessees to purchase land from State under HRS Chapter 516. 483 F. Supp. 63.

Legislative declaration of public use and finding of necessity are not constitutional prerequisites. 43 H. 255.

Application of ordinance regulating outdoor signs did not constitute a taking of private property without payment of compensation. 50 H. 33, 429 P.2d 825.

Law imposing on private employers obligation to pay their employees for service on juries and public boards, constituted taking. 52 H. 327, 475 P.2d 679.

Attorney's fees and expenses are not embraced within "just compensation". 53 H. 582, 499 P.2d 663.

Condemnation of leased fee interests in residential houselots continued to satisfy "public use" prerequisite of Fifth Amendment and article I, §20 of Hawai`i constitution. 79 H. 64, 898 P.2d 576.

See also notes to amendment 14.

In absence of exigent circumstances, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. 510 U.S. 43.

Trial court's finding that defendants had actual notice of trespassing prohibition is not clearly erroneous and does not violate due process. 582 F.2d 1194.

Defendant was not denied due process by alleged prosecutorial misconduct before grand jury. 614 F.2d 214.

Interest in receiving medical care at Hale Mohalu leprosy facility may be a property interest protected by due process clause if more than a "unilateral expectation." 616 F.2d 410.

Federal employee not denied due process because disciplinary action was based on charges in notice, and even though investigative officer asked questions about pending charges. 625 F.2d 285.

Only where defendant alleges governmental conduct "of the most shocking and outrageous kind" will due process be violated and court required to divest itself of jurisdiction. 625 F.2d 308.

Use for impeachment purposes of defendant's silence at time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings violates due process. 639 F.2d 466.

No legitimate entitlement to continued employment obtained through deliberate material misrepresentation. 649 F.2d 748.

Range of due process rights at sentencing not as extensive as that at trial. 694 F.2d 200.

Forfeiture rules under federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not violate. 715 F.2d 1339.

Not violated by jury instruction's connection between extensive use of currency and wilful criminal tax activity. Not violated by extrajudicial communication between juror and prosecutor regarding matter unrelated to trial. 730 F.2d 1292.

Where legal arguments only are involved, and the material issues have been briefed, no requirement for oral argument covering all legal theories. 738 F.2d 1455.

Defendant's unrebutted allegations of prejudice from absence of counsel at previous trial sufficient to warrant dismissal of indictment on due process grounds. 741 F.2d 1123.

Procedures under which defendant sentenced as second offender complied with requirements. 750 F.2d 787.

Not violated by magistrate-conducted voir dire in criminal case without defendant's consent. 760 F.2d 999.

Where Miranda inapplicable because confession obtained by foreign police, trustworthiness of confession must still satisfy due process. 783 F.2d 1052.

Not violated by issuance, without opportunity for hearing, and enforcement of bar letter excluding defendant from military base. 783 F.2d 1484.

Test of whether prison guard's use of force against inmate denies due process. 795 F.2d 780.

Court's finding that guilty plea was knowing rebuts claim that defense counsel's erroneous advice rendered plea "unintelligent". 800 F.2d 861.

Defendant could rely on appellate court's decision in repeating the same conduct, before the appellate decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. 830 F.2d 985.

Not violated where probationer was not given notice prior to drug testing. 831 F.2d 176.

No sham prosecution by federal authorities if there was sufficient independent federal involvement. 831 F.2d 181.

An acquittal based on a ruling that the government's evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction is not appealable. 833 F.2d 135.

Controversy was not ripe. 887 F.2d 215.

Not violated by sentencing court's reliance on evidence at co-defendant's trial. 909 F.2d 363.

Not offended by exercise of jurisdiction over defendants since sufficient nexus existed where vessel with marijuana off-loaded from Panamanian freighter was ultimately bound for U.S. 946 F.2d 608.

Violated by government's seizure of owner's home pursuant to federal Controlled Substances Act without preseizure notice or hearing. 971 F.2d 1376.

Supervised releasee's due process right of confrontation violated. 984 F.2d 308.

Violated by prosecutor's comments during closing rebuttal argument on defendants' postarrest silence. 998 F.2d 412.

Federal maritime drug enforcement statute's application to defendants not unconstitutional where there was sufficient nexus between defendant crew members and the U.S. as ship's drug cargo was destined for the U.S. 35 F.3d 426.

Federal wastewater treatment permit not unconstitutionally vague where defendants were knowledgeable in wastewater field, could be expected to have understood what the permit meant, and took considerable pains to conceal their illegal dumping activities. 35 F.3d 1275.

Not violated by rule that, for purposes of criminal history calculation, state conviction for conduct which occurred after defendant's federal offense, but for which defendant was sentenced before defendant's sentencing on the federal offense, is counted as a prior sentence. 44 F.3d 749.

Not violated by a court's entry of default judgment or other sanction against a party for refusal to cooperate with discovery and if party is later held to the consequences of such judgment in a bankruptcy discharge proceeding. 47 F.3d 365.

Employee's contention that employee's designation as a witness in IRS summons to obtain handwriting exemplars was a calculated maneuver to circumvent employee's Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures and employee's due process rights under both Fifth Amendment and IRS regulations, rejected. 94 F.3d 1342.

Where appellants contended that restrictions on organizations that accept Legal Services Corporation funds violated equal protection and due process rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, appellants failed to establish their standing to raise the rights of their clients. 145 F.3d 1017.

Defendant failed to establish the actual, nonspeculative prejudice from government's delay in bringing third superseding indictment that is necessary to prove a Fifth Amendment violation based upon excessive preindictment delay. 322 F.3d 1157.

Delay of 6 months between date of offense and indictment held not excessive. 316 F. Supp. 892.

Re court's relocation of private land boundary without due process. 402 F. Supp. 95.

Forfeiture proceeding satisfied due process rights of purchaser of property, who was unaware of prior owner's tax debt. 429 F. Supp. 1002.

Congress had a rational basis for preempting state health insurance laws and did not violate due process. 442 F. Supp. 695.

Nonjudicial punishment by way of Captain's Mast procedure does not deny due process. 466 F. Supp. 257.

Law providing for affidavit method of postjudgment garnishment of wages not unconstitutional. 467 F. Supp. 544.

Determination of whether taking is for public purpose is limited to whether there is a denial of substantive due process. Statute is constitutional if: (1) any possible rationale for the statute, expressed or not, is within state police power; and (2) statute is not arbitrary or product of legislative bad faith. 483 F. Supp. 63.

Violated if civilians prosecuted differently than military personnel for traffic violations on military bases. 604 F. Supp. 416.

Thirty-three month delay between alleged offense and return of indictment was not a violation of defendant's due process rights. 666 F. Supp. 1428.

Award of punitive damages for wanton, oppressive, or malicious actions did not violate due process. 728 F. Supp. 1461.

Legislature's decision not to define statutory terms does not render such statutes unconstitutional. 751 F. Supp. 853.

Administrative segregation of prisoner invoked due process. 751 F. Supp. 1401.

No due process liberty interest in parole is created under §§353-68 and 353-69; inmate had due process liberty interest at stake at misconduct hearing. 795 F. Supp. 1020.

Facts did not support a claim of either procedural due process or takings clause violation; termination of special use permits did not require compensation because they were not property interests recognized by the Fifth Amendment. 875 F. Supp. 680.

Where defendant's phone conversations with person working at behest of FBI were voluntary, defendant's due process rights not violated. 961 F. Supp. 1398.

Where plaintiffs filed action for temporary restraining order claiming, inter alia, that by not allowing enough time for plaintiffs to challenge the agency decision to launch the Cassini Mission, defendants violated plaintiffs' right to procedural due process, court assumed that judicial review under National Environmental Policy Act and Administrative Procedures Act was the protected right at the center of the procedural due process claim; plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to obtain judicial review of the agency decision. 980 F. Supp. 1160.

Motion to dismiss indictment on ground that deportation order, an essential element of crime charged (unauthorized reentry into the United States after previous deportation), was procured in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair, granted. 107 F. Supp. 2d 1248.

Where plaintiff protested Federal Aviation Administration requirement that plaintiff retire as air traffic controller at age fifty-six, while other air traffic controllers were allowed to work past that age, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment granted as to plaintiff's right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment claim. 128 F. Supp. 2d 672.

Law providing for service of summons on nonresident motorists by publication does not violate due process clause. 50 H. 484, 443 P.2d 155.

Discussion of preindictment delay resulting in deprivation of due process. 53 H. 652, 500 P.2d 1171.

Courts' construing prior land court decree was not a taking of private property even though it established a different shoreline boundary. 57 H. 585, 562 P.2d 771.

Constitutional permissibility of lifting of bar of statute of limitations to restore a remedy previously barred. 59 H. 259, 581 P.2d 310.

Condition of probation that defendant "refrain from company of people of questionable character" was not invalid for vagueness. 59 H. 366, 580 P.2d 1282.

Defendant who leaves trial voluntarily waives right to be present at trial, which may continue as if defendant were present. 62 H. 309, 615 P.2d 91.

Accused's right to a fair trial includes right to present matters in the accused's defense, and government may not by its conduct render a material witness unavailable to defendant. 63 H. 27, 620 P.2d 728; 63 H. 34, 620 P.2d 732.

Lineup of accused and due process rights. 63 H. 354, 628 P.2d 1018.

No violation in court's refusal to order production of letter concerning dismissal of charges against prosecution witness because no material effect on trial's outcome. 66 H. 175, 657 P.2d 1052.

Requires that State fulfill its end of plea bargain if defendant's guilty plea based in significant degree on promised resolution of cases against defendant. 66 H. 342, 662 P.2d 1112.

Not violated due to thirty-one month preindictment delay; a showing of memory loss alone is insufficient to demonstrate substantial prejudice. 67 H. 247, 686 P.2d 9.

Not violated by methodology used by public utilities commission rate making proceeding. 67 H. 425, 690 P.2d 274.

Due process denied where lessee's property seized without proper service of process, time to answer, evidence presented by lessor, and opportunity to contest case. 68 H. 466, 719 P.2d 397.

Not violated by court's entering of judgment against defendants for violating court order. 68 H. 608, 726 P.2d 254.

One year limitation on right to former spouse's property does not violate due process. 69 H. 1, 730 P.2d 338.

Police tactics designed to detect drug-related offenses, including officer posing as drug dealer and supplying and selling drugs in "reverse buy" operation, were not so outrageous as to deprive defendant of right to due process. 73 H. 179, 830 P.2d 492.

Right not violated by defendant's absence from conference settling jury instructions as conference does not involve jury's presence or witness testimony. 74 H. 141, 838 P.2d 1374.

Section 703-309(1) not unconstitutionally vague as it describes with sufficient clarity level of force that may be justifiably used in discipline of a minor. 81 H. 5, 911 P.2d 725.

A vessel and its accompanying mooring and live-aboard permits are constitutionally protected "property", of which an individual may not be deprived without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

Procedural due process violated where State informed boat owner by letter of impoundment and possible disposal of vessel, but made no mention of any procedures available for challenging that action, administrative or otherwise, and boat owner was never provided with an opportunity to be heard on matter of vessel's impoundment. 91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

Refusal of court to permit defendant at an identification suppression hearing to examine the identification witness was not violative of constitutional rights. 1 H. App. 335, 619 P.2d 1078.

Testimony presented through interpreter was understandable, comprehensible, and intelligible. 5 H. App. 20, 686 P.2d 28.

Show up identification was sufficiently reliable. 5 H. App. 127, 681 P.2d 573.

Materiality of evidence suppressed by prosecution. 5 H. App. 350, 692 P.2d 1166.

Termination or reduction of welfare benefits pursuant to original notice even though adopted rules invalidated. New notices after readoption not required. 5 H. App. 419, 697 P.2d 43.

Not violated by revival of paternity action. 5 H. App. 558, 705 P.2d 535.

Right to participate in interscholastic sports not protected interest. 6 H. App. 397, 721 P.2d 165.

Violated where petitioner whose driver's license was administratively revoked denied right to cross-examine director's representative regarding basis for continuance of administrative hearing. 80 H. 358 (App.), 910 P.2d 129.

Defendant entitled to elicit evidence of complainant's past sexual behavior, not to attack complainant's character, but to determine whether complainant was mentally defective and whether defendant knew that complainant was mentally defective. 81 H. 447 (App.), 918 P.2d 254.

Where building addition was permitted structure under zoning ordinance in existence at time subsequent land use ordinance was adopted, requiring landowner to remove addition and pay daily fines until addition was removed constituted interference with landowner's vested property rights under this clause. 86 H. 343 (App.), 949 P.2d 183.

Right violated by trial court entering free-standing restitution order where no notice was provided to defendant that defendant's original sentence might be modified at the hearing on the probation officer's motion to revoke restitution. 92 H. 36 (App.), 986 P.2d 987.

Where trial court did not apply clear and convincing standard of proof on complainant as required by §604-10.5, applied a subjective rather than objective reasonable person standard in evaluating whether defendant's conduct caused complainant emotional distress, and violated defendant's due process rights, court erred by denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of injunction order. 92 H. 330 (App.), 991 P.2d 840.

Section 706-662 not unconstitutional facially or as applied to case where sentencing judge found, upon certified documents stipulated into evidence by the parties, the predicate facts regarding defendant's two prior felony convictions, and that an extended prison term was necessary for protection of the public. 101 H. 97 (App.), 63 P.3d 405.

Federal government could not require free public access to Kuapa Pond without paying just compensation. 444 U.S. 164.

Public use limitation not subsumed under police power/due process analysis. 702 F.2d 788.

No cases finding a substantive due process violation based on a planning document. Qualified immunity is not available as a defense to private parties in a Bivens suit. 869 F.2d 1312.

Government does not take an individual's property unless it has denied the economically viable use of the land; a substantial reduction of the attractiveness of the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to compensation. 913 F.2d 573.

Where plaintiff argued that §3(c) of Act 257, [L 1997, (§486H-10.4(c))] ("Act 257") effected a regulatory taking because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, district court erred in granting summary judgment because resolution of factual issues was necessary to determine whether Act 257 substantially advanced, or bore a reasonable relationship to, State's interest in lowering gasoline prices; summary judgment inappropriate on other two grounds urged by plaintiff. 224 F.3d 1030.

Ordinance, a rent control measure limiting increases in ground rent due owner of land under condominium units, effected a regulatory taking and was unconstitutional. 124 F.3d 1150.

Where landowners argued that ordinance creating mechanism through which condominium owners could convert their leasehold interests into fee simple interests violated public use clause of U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions, ordinance was constitutional; landowners' claim under just compensation clause not ripe for federal adjudication. 124 F.3d 1150.

Right to develop property, including right to lease land to build hotel, not a protectable property interest; Queen's Beach is separate parcel for determining "taking". 649 F. Supp. 926.

City ordinance purporting to impose maximum ceiling on renegotiated lease rents for residential condominiums was unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. 759 F. Supp. 1477.

City ordinance imposing ceiling on renegotiated ground lease rents for owner-occupied residential condominium units unconstitutional; ordinance providing mechanism for transfer of fee interest from condominium lessors to lessees by payment of just compensation constitutional. 802 F. Supp. 326.

Condominium lease-to-fee ordinance did not effect an impermissible taking. 832 F. Supp. 1404.

Facts did not support a claim of either procedural due process or takings clause violation; termination of special use permits did not require compensation because they were not property interests recognized by the Fifth Amendment. 875 F. Supp. 680.

Rent cap in Act 257 [L 1997, (§486H-10.4(c)(2))] was unconstitutional; Act 257's imposition of a cap on the rent that an oil company may charge a lessee-dealer did not substantially advance State's legitimate interest in lowering gasoline prices. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182.

Enforcement of referendum did not result in taking because referendum certified before any post-zoning approvals were obtained. 65 H. 318, 653 P.2d 766.

54 H. 174 did not address question of whether cessation of any particular diversion would in fact constitute a taking. 65 H. 641, 658 P.2d 287.

As Hawaiian custom and usage have always been part of the laws of the State, court's recognition of customary and traditional Hawaiian rights did not constitute judicial taking. 79 H. 425, 903 P.2d 1246.

No violation by impoundment of vessel where impoundment was undertaken in substantial advancement of legitimate state interests -- to prevent the sinking vessel from obstructing a public waterway; owner thus not entitled to compensation. 91 H. 1, 979 P.2d 586.

As water is a state public trust resource to which no individual, including Waiahole Ditch water use permittees, could claim an exclusive right, permittees being required to fund subsequent stream studies and monitoring activities was not an unconstitutional "regulatory leveraging". 94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

No unconstitutional taking of petitioner's property without just compensation by water resource management commission's denying petitioner's request to use the ground water underlying its lands and allocating it instead to other leeward parties where the right to absolute ownership of water exclusive of the public trust never accompanied the "bundle of rights" conferred in the Mahele. 94 H. 97, 9 P.3d 409.

Statute requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets is reasonable exercise of the police power. 51 H. 516, 465 P.2d 573.

Exclusive use of hearsay testimony before grand jury. 78-1 HLR 78-301.

Due process; hearing. 78-2 HLR 78-1295.