Act of violence or intimidation need not be done for very purpose of taking the property to constitute robbery. 56 H. 343, 537 P.2d 724.

In absence of evidence that gun was not loaded or capable of being fired, an inference exists that it was capable of inflicting the harm which the robber threatened and was a dangerous instrument within this section. 57 H. 150, 552 P.2d 357.

Whether instrument used in robbery is a dangerous instrument is a question of fact for jury to resolve. 57 H. 365, 556 P.2d 569.

Assault by person armed with dangerous instrument with intent to rob is within subsection (1)(b)(i). 59 H. 148, 577 P.2d 793.

Accomplice. 62 H. 25, 608 P.2d 855.

Applicability of claim of right defense. 62 H. 25, 608 P.2d 855.

An unloaded gun as a dangerous instrument. 63 H. 405, 629 P.2d 626.

Threatened use of force against several persons did not constitute more than one count of robbery. 65 H. 156, 648 P.2d 197; 4 H. App. 573, 670 P.2d 1290.

Firearms are per se dangerous weapons. 69 H. 44, 731 P.2d 1261.

Jury instruction should have stated that if jury found defendant committed attempted murder and robbery concurrently, it need not render two verdicts. 70 H. 618, 780 P.2d 1097.

Defendant convicted of both kidnapping and robbery because crimes did not occur concurrently. 71 H. 46, 781 P.2d 662.

Trial judge erred in refusing to instruct jury regarding the possible merger of the robbery and kidnapping counts against defendant. 77 H. 17, 881 P.2d 504.

First degree burglary not an included offense of first degree robbery. 81 H. 309, 916 P.2d 1210.

Theft and attempted theft, regardless of degree, are included offenses of first degree robbery. 81 H. 309, 916 P.2d 1210.

A victim's awareness of the theft is a necessary element of robbery pursuant to subsection (1)(b)(ii). 86 H. 37, 947 P.2d 349.

Where defendant’s conviction and sentence under this section was an included offense under §134-6(a) and defendant’s convictions under both §134-4(a) and this section violated §701-109(1)(a), defendant’s conviction and sentence under this section reversed. 91 H. 33, 979 P.2d 1059.

Where defendant’s convictions were premised upon the use of "any firearm" and language of indictments and trial court’s instructions "to wit, a semiautomatic pistol" did not alter the statutory elements of §§134-6, 134-7, or this section, trial court’s error of not providing definition of "semiautomatic firearm" did not warrant reversal of convictions of first degree robbery, carrying or use of firearm in commission of separate felony, or felon in possession of firearm. 91 H. 33, 979 P.2d 1059.

Whether a loaded pellet pistol is a dangerous instrument is a question of fact. 1 H. App. 481, 620 P.2d 1087.

Where defendant did not use force in the course of committing theft, no first degree robbery committed within meaning of paragraph (1)(b)(i). 9 H. App. 263, 833 P.2d 902.

Instructions constituted plain error, where (1) court instructed jury that a knife is a dangerous instrument; and (2) instruction defined the imminent use of force. 9 H. App. 628, 859 P.2d 925.

Act 68, Session Laws 1998, amended §708-840 by including in the offense of robbery in the first degree, situations where a person knowingly inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury on another in the course of committing a theft. The legislature believed that since robbery was essentially an assault committed during the course of a theft, the statutory scheme involving the highest degree of robbery, robbery in the first degree, should be consistent with that of the assault statutes, and thus, robbery in the first degree should include both the intentional and knowing states of mind. Act 68 made the offense of robbery in the first degree consistent with the offense of assault in the first degree. House Standing Committee Report No. 1231-98.