Appeal to circuit court, see HRCP rule 72; appeal to supreme court, see Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Cost of record transmitted to the reviewing court is borne by the agency. Att. Gen. Op. 64-4.

Standing to Challenge Administrative Action in the Federal and Hawaiian Courts. 8 HBJ 37.

Appellate Standards of Review in Hawaii. 7 UH L. Rev. 273. (See also 7 UH L. Rev. 449.)

An Analysis of the Standing and Jurisdiction Prerequisites for Direct Appeal of Agency Actions to the Circuit Court Under the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act After Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission and Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture. 17 UH L. Rev. 375.

Hawai`i Appellate Standards of Review Revisited. 18 UH L. Rev. 645.

1998 Hawai`i Legislation and Case Law Update. 21 UH L. Rev. 317.

Section contained appropriate statute of limitations for State to file action in federal court under Education For All Handicapped Children Act. 695 F.2d 1154.

Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against dental board barred by res judicata as plaintiff failed to seek state court judicial review of dental board's order failing plaintiff on dental exam. 60 F.3d 626.

Review of decision of civil service commission is on the record. 48 H. 278, 398 P.2d 155.

Question whether provision for appeal of preliminary ruling overrides provisions of specific statutes governing administrative agencies, raised but not decided. 50 H. 22, 428 P.2d 411.

Procedure applicable to grant of summary judgment after appeal to circuit court. 50 H. 169, 434 P.2d 312.

Subsection (g) referred to: 50 H. 426, 442 P.2d 61.

Where zoning variance is granted after public hearing, owner of land adjoining the property subject to variance is "person aggrieved." 52 H. 518, 479 P.2d 796.

"Person aggrieved", to be entitled to judicial review, must have been involved in the contested case. 53 H. 431, 495 P.2d 1180.

"Person aggrieved." 56 H. 260, 535 P.2d 1102; 64 H. 451, 643 P.2d 73.

Test under "clearly erroneous" standard is whether appellate court has a firm and definite conviction mistake was made. 56 H. 552, 545 P.2d 692; 4 H. App. 26, 659 P.2d 77.

Where tenure hearing not required, application did not create "contested case". 56 H. 680, 548 P.2d 253.

"Clearly erroneous" standard applies to review of labor and industrial relations appeals board decisions. 57 H. 296, 555 P.2d 855.

Nature of appeal to circuit court under this section discussed. 58 H. 292, 568 P.2d 1189.

Appeal from decision of administrative agency acting without jurisdiction confers no jurisdiction on appellate court. 60 H. 65, 587 P.2d 301.

Paragraph (g) cited as authority to remand a cause to the public utilities commission to make appropriate findings to support its order. 60 H. 166, 590 P.2d 524.

"Clearly erroneous" standard of review discussed. 60 H. 166, 590 P.2d 524; 66 H. 401, 664 P.2d 727; 67 H. 212, 685 P.2d 794; 2 H. App. 421, 633 P.2d 564.

Final order means an order ending the proceedings. Appellee's actions were not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious where appellant's filing of a grievance was untimely. 60 H. 513, 591 P.2d 621.

Standard of review under subsection (g) for decisions of administrative agencies acting within sphere of expertise. 60 H. 625, 594 P.2d 612; 5 H. App. 71, 678 P.2d 584.

Organization opposing reclassification of properties and which is composed of members who live in vicinity of properties is a "person aggrieved" under subsection (a). 61 H. 3, 594 P.2d 1079.

"Participation in contested case" discussed. 61 H. 3, 594 P.2d 1079.

Timely appeal. 61 H. 3, 594 P.2d 1079.

Mere failure to include name of agency (which rendered decision being appealed) in caption of notice of appeal does not render appeal defective. 62 H. 444, 616 P.2d 1368.

Finality of order, what determines. 63 H. 85, 621 P.2d 361.

So long as requirements of subsection (a) are met, the circuit court is vested with jurisdiction to hear appeal. 63 H. 85, 621 P.2d 361.

Land use commission. Final order. 63 H. 529, 631 P.2d 588.

Court did not abuse discretion in refusing to allow expert witnesses to testify in court, or refusing to require transcript of oral comments before agency. 64 H. 27, 636 P.2d 158.

Decision of administrative agency was clearly erroneous. 65 H. 146, 648 P.2d 1107.

Department of education was not a "person" with standing to appeal administrative action. 65 H. 219, 649 P.2d 1140.

Granting of special management area permit by county planning commission. 65 H. 506, 654 P.2d 874.

Agency's decision to reduce welfare benefits is reviewable only by appeal under this section and not by declaratory judgment action. 66 H. 485, 666 P.2d 1133.

Agency's procedural irregularities did not prejudice appellant's substantial rights. 67 H. 342, 686 P.2d 831.

Board's denial of a motion for reconsideration is a "final order". 67 H. 603, 699 P.2d 26.

Police chief is a "person" with a standing to appeal civil service commission's ruling. 68 H. 432, 718 P.2d 1076.

Apprenticeship committee was not "person aggrieved" by labor director's rejection of its recommendation; apprentice denied back wages and attorney's fees and costs upon reinstatement was "person aggrieved". 68 H. 605, 723 P.2d 753.

Unincorporated association was "person aggrieved" by decision to grant special management area permit, but association did not participate in a "contested case". 69 H. 81, 734 P.2d 161.

Judicial review of an agency determination must be confined to issues properly raised in the record of the administrative proceedings. 69 H. 135, 736 P.2d 1271.

Does not give administrative agencies the right to take an appeal from an administrative action, but the agency may support an appeal taken by an aggrieved party. 71 H. 545, 798 P.2d 442.

Standard used by appellate court when reviewing circuit court's review of agency decision. 74 H. 599, 851 P.2d 311; 78 H. 21, 889 P.2d 705; 79 H. 154, 900 P.2d 161; 9 H. App. 198, 828 P.2d 1284.

Subsection (g)(1) applied under right/wrong standard in review of circuit court’s review of employees’ retirement system declaratory order, where issue presented to circuit court concerned a question of statutory interpretation. 75 H. 42, 856 P.2d 1227.

Without a statutory, rule-based, or constitutional mandate for a hearing, the Hawaiian homes commission hearing that took place was not required by law and therefore did not constitute a contested case for the purposes of obtaining appellate review pursuant to subsection (a); consequently, judicial review by circuit court of commission’s denial of appellants’ request for a contested case hearing as well as review of commission’s approval of third- party agreements was unattainable due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 76 H. 128, 870 P.2d 1272.

Supreme court could not conclude that board of land and natural resources’ findings regarding application for conservation district use permit were clearly erroneous. 76 H. 259, 874 P.2d 1084.

Circuit court properly concluded that it was vested with appellate jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (a). With respect to issue of standing, certain appellees demonstrated sufficient participation and potential injury in fact to seek judicial review of agency decision; other appellees who did not sufficiently participate in contested case were precluded from seeking judicial review under subsection (a). 77 H. 64, 881 P.2d 1210.

"Clearly erroneous" standard applies to appeals from findings in decisions of labor and industrial relations appeals board. 77 H. 100, 881 P.2d 1246.

Appeal to circuit court of zoning board of appeals’ final decision and order was timely, and circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter. 77 H. 168, 883 P.2d 629.

Supreme court lacked appellate jurisdiction where there was no final decision with respect to claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits for incident which labor and industrial relations appeals board determined to be compensable. 77 H. 305, 884 P.2d 368.

Circuit court's appellate jurisdiction proper where planning commission rendered its final view, appellant was involved "in" the contested case and sufficiently demonstrated standing to participate. 79 H. 425, 903 P.2d 1246.

A water management area designation is not the product of a contested case hearing, under this chapter, from which a direct appeal to the supreme court may be brought under §174C-60. 83 H. 484, 927 P.2d 1367.

Where director's violation of §91-13 by consulting materials and individuals outside the record did not prejudice appellant's substantial rights, harmless error. 87 H. 217, 953 P.2d 1315.

Where county planning director’s decision that developer’s proposed action was inconsistent with community plan did not meet any of the standards for reversal under subsection (g), circuit court erred in reversing decision. 88 H. 108, 962 P.2d 367.

Where no express procedure provided in Maui charter or Maui special management area rules for appeal of Maui planning director’s decision on a minor permit application to the Maui planning commission, and commission delegated authority to render final decision on minor permit applications to director pursuant to §205A-22, director’s decision not to process developer’s application was a final decision equivalent to a denial of the application and was thus appealable under subsection (a). 88 H. 108, 962 P.2d 367.

A decision that finally adjudicates the matter of medical and temporary disability benefits under §§386-21, 386-31(b), and 386-32(b) is an appealable final order under subsection (a), even though the matter of permanent disability benefits under §§386-31(a) and 386-32(a) has been left for later determination. 89 H. 436, 974 P.2d 1026.

Where entitlement to permanent disability or disfigurement benefits is the right of the claimant that remains undetermined and is the matter for which jurisdiction is retained by the labor director, a decision of the labor and industrial relations appeals board that otherwise finally adjudicates the matters of medical and temporary disability benefits is an appealable final order under subsection (a). 89 H. 436, 974 P.2d 1026.

Where county board of appeals at no time questioned or disclaimed planning director's action, and director could not have issued denial of appeal on director's own authority, director acted on behalf of board when director summarily rejected plaintiffs' appeals as untimely; thus, director's denial constituted a "final decision" by the board under subsection (a), which circuit court had jurisdiction to review on appeal. 90 H. 384, 978 P.2d 822.

Cited in reviewing decision of the labor and industrial relations appeal board. 1 H. App. 350, 619 P.2d 516.

In overturning agency's order, court was required to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2 H. App. 92, 626 P.2d 199.

Finality of order. 2 H. App. 219, 629 P.2d 125.

Order of board not a "final order" where it remands a case to determine service-connected issue. 4 H. App. 526, 669 P.2d 638.

Review of agency decision confined to issues properly raised in record of proceedings leading up to decision. 5 H. App. 115, 678 P.2d 1101.

Public employers directly affected by agency's order were "aggrieved persons" and their filing of amicus briefs with agency was sufficient "adversary participation"; standard used by appellate court when reviewing circuit court's review of agency decision. 5 H. App. 533, 704 P.2d 917.

Does not require that all evidence before agency support its findings; sufficient if findings supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. 6 H. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950.

No "contested case" occurred even though there are situations where a public hearing may be considered a contested case because department rules established procedures for contested cases. 8 H. App. 16, 791 P.2d 1267.

Service of certified copy of agency decision under this section is complete when certified copy is deposited in the mail. 9 H. App. 298, 837 P.2d 311.

Standard used in review of administrative agency decision. 9 H. App. 377, 842 P.2d 648.

County of Hawai`i department of finance was an "agency" within the meaning of chapter 91, and was not a "person" entitled to appeal under this section (prior to 1993 amendment). 77 H. 396 (App.), 885 P.2d 1137.

Because appellant did not demonstrate that it suffered concrete injury, it was not a person "aggrieved" by HLRB decision; thus, it did not have standing to appeal decision to circuit court. 80 H. 376 (App.), 910 P.2d 147.

Cited: 47 H. 1, 24, 384 P.2d 536; 50 H. 172, 435 P.2d 21.

Mentioned: 904 F. Supp. 1098.

Timeliness of appeal. 79 HLR 79-0643.