Jury of the "district," see §806-17.

Constitutional amendment eliminating jury trial for serious criminal cases will not be consistent with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Att. Gen. Op. 68-10.

The jury referred to is a jury of twelve. Att. Gen. Op. 68-10.

Last sentence took effect upon ratification of proposal by voters on election day and not upon certification of result by Lieutenant Governor. Att. Gen. Op. 68-31.

Proposed legislation did not conflict with mandates of this section with regard to permitting a jury of six persons in cases involving "non-serious crimes". Att. Gen. Op. 97-2.

Suppression of Evidence Without the Aid of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 8 HBJ 109.

The Hawaii Supreme Court’s Criminal Law Decisions 1997-1998: Fair Use of the Doctrine of Plain Error? II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 49.

Included Offenses in Hawaii Case Law and the Rights to Trial by Jury: Coherence or Confusion. II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 77.

State v. Smith: The Standard of Effectiveness of Counsel in Hawaii Following Strickland v. Washington. 9 UH L. Rev. 371.

State v. Furutani: Hawai`i's Protection of a Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial--Verdict Impeachment Made Easy. 17 UH L. Rev. 307.

State v. Lindsey: "Petty" Offenses and the Right to Jury Trial under the Hawai`i Constitution. 17 UH L. Rev. 331.

Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992. 18 UH L. Rev. 683.

State v. Sinagoga: The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions in Hawai`i. 19 UH L. Rev. 813.

Section modeled after the 6th Amendment of the federal constitution and was intended to incorporate it and to give the State the benefit of federal decisions construing the same language. 47 H. 361, 385, 389 P.2d 439.

Defendant only afforded right to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses who can give relevant and beneficial testimony for defense. 64 H. 217, 638 P.2d 324; 67 H. 59, 677 P.2d 465.

Evidence did not show that testimony would have been relevant and beneficial to defense. 64 H. 217, 638 P.2d 324.

Violated by prohibition of witnesses' description testimony, though their identification testimony suppressed. 67 H. 123, 680 P.2d 253.

To protect the right to testify under Hawai`i constitution, trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and must obtain on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify. 79 H. 226, 900 P.2d 1293.

A trial court must pass on a defendant’s attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach", whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where defendant did not meet burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for withdrawal of defendant’s prior waiver of defendant’s right to testify, defendant failed to present "fair and just reasons" for defendant’s request to exercise defendant’s right to testify in defendant’s own behalf; thus trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that it would not reopen case. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where trial court’s denial of defendant’s post-verdict motion for a new trial--based on defendant’s claim that defendant’s attempt to withdraw defendant’s waiver of right to testify in defendant’s own behalf should have been allowed--was not "manifestly unjust", no abuse of discretion. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Defendant’s right to testify violated where trial court failed to establish on the record that defendant’s decision not to testify was made knowingly and voluntarily. 91 H. 275, 982 P.2d 904.

Not violated by trial court's refusal to allow further examination of witness. 5 H. App. 127, 681 P.2d 573.

Defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to testify in defendant’s own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant’s attorney’s advice and thus refrain from testifying, and the violation was plain error; denial of the right to testify was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

Trial court’s failure to obtain on-the-record waivers from co-defendants of their right to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, if co-defendants’ testimony had been added to version of events, jury’s decision may have been different. 92 H. 148 (App.), 988 P.2d 667.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 6.

Compulsory process provision construed; witness violating order excluding witnesses from courtroom should still be allowed to testify to guarantee to accused his constitutional right. 51 H. 581, 465 P.2d 560.

No violation where the State made a good faith effort to locate witness. 70 H. 343, 771 P.2d 509.

No violation where witness is unavailable and former testimony is used. 71 H. 274, 789 P.2d 497.

Lower court's failure to issue bench warrant for complaining witness in family abuse case, and denial of motion for dismissal without prejudice, violated appellant's right to confrontation. 72 H. 469, 822 P.2d 519.

Criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages of trial cannot be waived by counsel. 73 H. 97, 828 P.2d 280.

Error for trial court to refuse to permit a defense witness to testify as penalty for violating witness exclusion rule. 73 H. 331, 832 P.2d 269.

Right not violated by defendant's absence from conference settling jury instructions as conference does not involve jury's presence or witness testimony. 74 H. 141, 838 P.2d 1374.

Appellant’s right violated; trial court improperly admitted witness’ testimony under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule where prosecution failed to issue trial subpoena to declarant and failed to make showing of declarant’s unavailability. 74 H. 343, 845 P.2d 547.

Admission of co-defendant’s testimony concerning incriminatory out-of-court statements made against defendant did not violate defendant’s rights to confront defendant’s accuser under the U.S. or Hawai`i Constitutions. 76 H. 148, 871 P.2d 782.

Circuit court’s limitation of appellant’s cross-examination of witness did not violate appellant’s right to confront witnesses against appellant where appellant adequately raised issue of witness’ possible bias. 78 H. 383, 894 P.2d 80.

Defendant's right of confrontation under this section was violated by the admission of complainant's videotaped interview in lieu of direct examination. 79 H. 128, 900 P.2d 135.

Prior to introduction of videotaped interview, cross-examination of complainant sex assault victim regarding complainant's conversation with police officer satisfied defendant's right of confrontation. 80 H. 107, 905 P.2d 613.

Not violated by admission of declarant's former testimony under HRE Rule 804(b)(1) where prosecution established declarant's unavailability, that it had made good faith efforts to secure declarant's presence, and reliability of statement was shown. 82 H. 202, 921 P.2d 122.

Abuse of discretion where trial court excluded evidence of complainant's prior conviction, by prohibiting cross-examination of complainant, from which jury could have inferred that complainant had a motive to bring false charges against defendant and give false testimony at trial. 83 H. 109, 924 P.2d 1215.

Right violated as prosecution witness not "unavailable" under HRE Rule 804(a)(5); prosecution's good faith efforts require a search equally as vigorous as that which it would undertake to find a critical witness if it had no prior testimony to rely upon in the event of unavailability. 83 H. 267, 925 P.2d 1091.

Right not violated where trial court allowed defense adequate opportunity to raise issue of witness' possible bias while imposing modest restriction on defense's cross-examination of witness to avoid risk of prejudicing jury. 83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258.

Admission into evidence of witness’ grand jury testimony under HRE Rule 802.1(4), past recollection recorded hearsay exception, did not violate defendant’s right where witness’ testimony was supported by numerous guarantees of trustworthiness, and defendant was able to cross-examine witness on witness’ subsequent failure to remember alleged incident. 92 H. 61, 987 P.2d 959.

Admission into evidence of witness’ handwritten statement on the bottom of an identification form, under HRE Rule 802.1(4), past recollection recorded hearsay exception, did not violate defendant’s right where witness’ statement was supported by numerous guarantees of trustworthiness. 92 H. 61, 987 P.2d 959.

Not violated in DUI case by admission into evidence of log showing breath-testing instrument had been tested for accuracy. 9 H. App. 130, 828 P.2d 813.

Admission into evidence of redacted confessions of defendants-spouses violated defendants-spouses' confrontational rights. 10 H. App. 43, 861 P.2d 24.

Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by admission of "hearsay" statements. 79 H. 175 (App.), 900 P.2d 172.

Defendant entitled to elicit evidence of complainant's past sexual behavior, not to attack complainant's character, but to determine whether complainant was mentally defective and whether defendant knew that complainant was mentally defective. 81 H. 447 (App.), 918 P.2d 254.

Not violated by complainant's failure to testify at trial because complainant's statements were not hearsay and actual truth or falsity of statements were irrelevant to defendant's conviction for violating warning citation under §709-906. 82 H. 381 (App.), 922 P.2d 994.

Clause not violated where questions defendant wanted to ask police officer regarding officer's "motive" and "knowledge of how much cocaine a drug addict would consume" were not relevant to any issue in case. 82 H. 499 (App.), 923 P.2d 916.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 6.

Applied. 56 H. 23, 525 P.2d 1108.

There is no right to counsel at a post-arrest photographic display. 59 H. 167, 578 P.2d 236.

Effective assistance of counsel. 64 H. 62, 636 P.2d 742.

Effective assistance of counsel denied where defense counsel caused introduction of highly prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible evidence. 68 H. 304, 712 P.2d 496.

Violated where questioning continued after right invoked; use of defendant's unsuppressed statements not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 69 H. 51, 731 P.2d 1264.

Violated by introduction of evidence that defendant invoked right, where whether defendant had done so not at issue. 69 H. 68, 733 P.2d 690.

Claim that failure to call expert witnesses to rebut State's DNA profiling evidence introduced at motion in limine constituted ineffective assistance of counsel was meritless. 73 H. 130, 828 P.2d 1274.

Counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise contention that defendant had not waived right to be present at trial where defendant had voluntarily absented oneself after trial had begun. 73 H. 147, 828 P.2d 281.

Defendant has burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel and meet two-part test; under Hawaii Constitution, defendant afforded greater protection of right to effective assistance of counsel than under U.S. Constitution. 74 H. 54, 837 P.2d 1298.

No denial of effective assistance of counsel where counsel waived defendant's presence at conference settling jury instructions, withdrew insanity defense, and failed to object to examiner's testimony. 74 H. 141, 838 P.2d 1374.

Where petitioner’s convictions on counts I (attempted first degree murder), II (second degree murder), and III (attempted second degree murder) violated §701-109(1)(c)’s clear prohibition against inconsistent factual findings, the failure to raise this issue, both at trial and on appeal, resulted in withdrawal of not only a potentially meritorious defense, but a defense that would have altered the outcome. 74 H. 442, 848 P.2d 966.

Post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel Rule 40 petition not prejudiced where defendant alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle defendant to relief and claim is not patently frivolous and without trace of support in the record. 75 H. 419, 864 P.2d 583.

Trial counsel’s alleged errors did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant argued, inter alia, that trial counsel should have obtained expert analysis of white powder defendant provided to undercover police officer to determine how much "pure" cocaine it contained; rejection of defendant’s claim that trial counsel’s failure to interview and subpoena defendant’s girlfriend amounted to ineffective assistance was without prejudice to a subsequent HRPP rule 40 petition. 77 H. 72, 881 P.2d 1218.

Knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of right to counsel where, inter alia, defendant persistently refused legal assistance despite court's repeated invitation and amply demonstrated capacity to proceed pro se. 81 H. 198, 915 P.2d 672.

No ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel's failure to object to prosecution witnesses' testimony did not result in the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a meritorious defense. 81 H. 293, 916 P.2d 703.

Where attorney-client privilege was not applicable to communications because they were not "confidential" but "voluntarily disclosed" in known presence of third party who was neither codefendant nor representative of the client or of the lawyer and in a place accessible to the general public, right to effective assistance not violated. 84 H. 229, 933 P.2d 66.

A defense counsel’s representation is constitutionally ineffective under the Hawaii constitution if: (1) a relationship giving rise to a conflict of interest existed between defense counsel and his/her clients; and (2) either the relationship adversely affected defense counsel’s performance, or the client did not consent to the relationship. 88 H. 19, 960 P.2d 1227.

Right to assistance of counsel and to present a defense not violated by trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to present oral argument on motion for judgment of acquittal; no constitutional right to argue a motion for judgment of acquittal. 91 H. 288, 983 P.2d 189.

Right to assistance of counsel and to present a defense not violated by trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to present oral argument on motion for judgment of acquittal; no constitutional right to argue a motion for judgment of acquittal. 91 H. 288, 983 P.2d 189.

Not violated where imprisonment authorized but not imposed. 3 H. App. 673, 657 P.2d 1062.

No showing of knowing and intelligent waiver; infringement of right presumed prejudicial and State must rebut presumption and prove error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 H. App. 614, 672 P.2d 1036.

Standard for effective assistance of appellate counsel; right not violated. 6 H. App. 331, 720 P.2d 1015.

No right to hybrid representation. 8 H. App. 330, 802 P.2d 482.

No ineffective assistance of counsel based on various grounds, including conflict of interest and failure of counsel to: file pre-trial motion to dismiss indictment based on insufficient evidence; investigate and obtain testimony of witnesses; call certain witnesses; object to admission of certain evidence; and challenge selection of jurors or composition of jury. 88 H. 19, 960 P.2d 1227.

Where defendant could have challenged the validity of the search warrant if given a range of dates of the observations by prosecution’s confidential informant and defendant’s attorney could file the appropriate pre-trial motions and prepare for trial without the exact dates, right to effective assistance of counsel not violated by defendant not knowing the exact dates of the observations. 88 H. 396, 967 P.2d 228.

Where an accused has been arrested and interrogated by police and has not been specifically advised by court or accused’s counsel that accused has constitutional right to counsel at every stage of proceeding following that arrest, accused cannot be held to have knowingly and intelligently waived that right, and any statements made by accused to police absent the advice are inadmissible. 9 H. App. 447, 845 P.2d 1194.

Where defendant contended that defendant was denied constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at trial because defendant’s trial counsel, deputy - defender, concurrently represented defendant’s brother in another criminal case and defendant’s defense at trial was that brother was the actual perpetrator of offenses for which defendant was convicted, case remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine whether conflict of interest actually existed when trial counsel represented defendant and, if so, whether the conflict prejudiced defendant’s right. 77 H. 374 (App.), 884 P.2d 1150.

The court’s assumption of defense counsel’s role by persuading defendant to relinquish defendant’s right to testify was an interference with the attorney-client relationship protected by Sixth Amendment to U.S. Constitution and this section; the intervention by the court constituted plain error; the error was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

Indigent defendant charged with offense punishable by term of imprisonment entitled at trial to be assisted by appointed counsel. 80 H. 246 (App.), 909 P.2d 574.

Defendant did not waive right to court-appointed counsel where defendant requested substitute court-appointed counsel and was not afforded reasonable opportunity to show good cause for a substitute court-appointed counsel. 80 H. 262 (App.), 909 P.2d 590.

Absent valid waiver of right, use of prior uncounseled felony convictions to enhance prison sentence violates defendant's right to counsel. 81 H. 421 (App.), 918 P.2d 228.

If sentencing court gives consideration to defendant's previous convictions in choosing to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, court must ensure that any prior felony, misdemeanor, and petty misdemeanor conviction relied on was with defendant receiving assistance of counsel. 81 H. 421 (App.), 918 P.2d 228.

No ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel's failure to request trial continuance when police officer was unavailable to testify at trial did not result in prejudice to defendant. 82 H. 394 (App.), 922 P.2d 1007.

No ineffective assistance where, inter alia, defendant's counsel adequately prepared for trial, did not fail to offer motion to sever trials, and no evidence that fact that defendant's counsel was not lead counsel was prejudicial to defendant's entrapment defense. 82 H. 499 (App.), 923 P.2d 916.

Right of self-representation is guaranteed by this section. Mere appointment of standby counsel over a defendant’s objection does not per se violate this section; the level of standby counsel’s participation determines whether a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation has been violated. 75 H. 307, 861 P.2d 11.

Requirements of HRPP rule 18 and this section having been satisfied, venue was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 H. 185, 891 P.2d 272.

Referred to: 51 H. 195, 456 P.2d 805.

Section modeled after 6th Amendment of federal constitution. 51 H. 612, 466 P.2d 422.

Jury trials not required in "petty" offenses. 51 H. 612, 466 P.2d 422.

Driving under influence is serious crime entitling accused persons right to jury trial; statutory amendment limiting incarceration periods did not reduce seriousness of crime. 72 H. 597, 825 P.2d 1065.

Waiver of right to jury trial cannot be presumed by silent record. 73 H. 217, 830 P.2d 512.

Defendant charged with driving after license suspended for driving under influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of §291-4.5 (1985), not entitled to jury trial. 75 H. 68, 856 P.2d 1240.

Because the record was silent as to any colloquy between court and defendant, counsel’s waiver of client’s right was invalid, violating defendant’s right to trial by jury under this section and Sixth Amendment to U.S. Constitution. 75 H. 118, 857 P.2d 576.

Charge of first-offense DUI under §291-4, as amended by Act 128, L 1993 was constitutionally petty; being a constitutionally petty offense, no right to a jury trial attached to first-offense DUI. 76 H. 360, 878 P.2d 699.

Defendant did not have a right to jury trial on prostitution charges. 77 H. 162, 883 P.2d 83.

Offense is presumptively a petty offense to which right to a jury trial does not attach, if maximum authorized term of imprisonment for offense does not exceed thirty days. 77 H. 162, 883 P.2d 83.

Where no term of imprisonment was authorized under §266-25 for violation of administrative rule regulating boat moorings, violation a presumptively petty offense for which right to jury trial did not attach; consideration of other relevant factors failed to overcome presumption. 84 H. 65, 929 P.2d 78.

Findings under §706-662(5) regarding (a) the age or handicapped status of the victim and (b) whether "such disability is known or reasonably should be known to the defendant" entail "intrinsic" facts; Hawaii constitution requires these findings to be made by the trier of fact, not the sentencing court. 91 H. 261, 982 P.2d 890

When a fact susceptible to jury determination is a predicate to the imposition of an enhanced sentence, the Hawaii constitution requires that such factual determinations be made by the trier of fact. 91 H. 261, 982 P.2d 890.

Findings under §706-662(5) regarding (a) the age or handicapped status of the victim and (b) whether "such disability is known or reasonably should be known to the defendant" entail "intrinsic" facts; Hawaii constitution requires these findings to be made by the trier of fact, not the sentencing court. 91 H. 261, 982 P.2d 890.

When a fact susceptible to jury determination is a predicate to the imposition of an enhanced sentence, the Hawaii constitution requires that such factual determinations be made by the trier of fact. 91 H. 261, 982 P.2d 890.

Defendant must personally give oral or written waiver of right to jury trial; waiver by defense counsel not valid in absence of any colloquy between court and defendant. 80 H. 372 (App.), 910 P.2d 143.

Right not erroneously denied where plaintiff missed ten-day jury demand deadline under DCRCP Rule 38(b) without adequate excuse. 83 H. 50 (App.), 924 P.2d 544.

Manner in which defendant’s family was excluded from courtroom violated defendant’s right to a public trial. 91 H. 181, 981 P.2d 1127.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend 6.

Violated by foreperson's statement to other jurors, based on own experience, that minors' claims of sexual molestation were reliable. 68 H. 575, 722 P.2d 1039.

Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated when it was found that a juror had a bias to defendant's refusal to take the witness stand. 71 H. 389, 791 P.2d 1266.

Questioning only the jury foreperson does not resolve the matter of jury misconduct. 72 H. 97, 807 P.2d 593.

Jury was not tainted by anonymous phone calls to some of the jurors where no threat was made or where there was no actual reference to the trial. 72 H. 106, 807 P.2d 1264.

Trial court's supplemental instruction to deadlocked jury that it must unanimously decide that it was unable to reach verdict was prejudicial. 72 H. 327, 817 P.2d 1054.

Consideration of non-evidentiary materials by jury during deliberations and failure to rebut presumption of prejudice resulted in denial of right to fair trial. 72 H. 475, 823 P.2d 152.

Trial court must insure that defendant's right to fair trial is not compromised and at the least prevent or reduce prejudicial pretrial publicity; order imposing restrictions on extrajudicial statements of trial participants was impermissible. 73 H. 499, 835 P.2d 637.

Circuit court did not commit an abuse of discretion in granting defendant’s motion for new trial; circuit court’s conclusions of law that possible juror misconduct at voir dire and juror misconduct during deliberations deprived defendant of a trial by twelve fair and impartial jurors not clearly erroneous. 76 H. 172, 873 P.2d 51.

Newscast concerning appellants and their alleged involvement in a burglary other than those charged and prospective juror’s account of the newscast and the effect it had on prospective juror that was given in presence of jury panel, discussed as "outside influences". 78 H. 383, 894 P.2d 80.

Not violated by empaneling of anonymous jury where there was strong reason to believe jury needed protection and trial court took reasonable steps to minimize any prejudicial effect on defendant and ensure that defendant's fundamental rights were protected. 83 H. 507, 928 P.2d 1.

Purpose of §612-18(c) is to uphold a criminal defendant's constitutional guarantees of a presumption of innocence and an impartial jury. 83 H. 507, 928 P.2d 1.

The right of an accused to a unanimous verdict in a criminal prosecution, tried before a jury in a court of this State, is guaranteed by this section and §5 of this article of the Hawaii constitution. 84 H. 1, 928 P.2d 843.

When separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault, the trial court must either (1) require the prosecution to elect the specific act upon which the prosecution is relying to establish the "conduct" element of the charged offense, or (2) give the jury a specific unanimity instruction. 84 H. 1, 928 P.2d 843.

Defendant’s right not violated by having husband and wife serve on same jury; both expressly stated during voir dire that they would each make their own decisions and would not automatically go along with the other person. 88 H. 19, 960 P.2d 1227.

Where trial court failed to correct prosecution’s erroneous interpretation of "remains unlawfully" under §708-810, defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and a unanimous jury verdict violated. 89 H. 284, 972 P.2d 287.

Manner in which defendant’s family was excluded from courtroom violated defendant’s right to a public trial. 91 H. 181, 981 P.2d 1127.

Where trial court erred by ruling that evidence of defendant’s eligibility for HUD assistance was irrelevant under HRE rule 401 and thus inadmissible under rule 402 when evidence was probative of and relevant to defendant’s requisite intent, defendant’s right to present a complete defense violated. 91 H. 275, 982 P.2d 904.

References to race that do not have an objectively legitimate purpose constitute a particularly egregious form of prosecutorial misconduct. 91 H. 405, 984 P.2d 1231.

Where there was a reasonable possibility that prosecutor’s comment during closing argument might have contributed to defendant’s conviction, prosecutor’s comment constituted prosecutorial misconduct that denied defendant right to a fair trial. 91 H. 405, 984 P.2d 1231.

Failure to inquire into circumstances of statement overheard by juror, and reliance on juror's own determination of ability to remain impartial while unaware of influences is reversible error. 2 H. App. 643, 639 P.2d 413.

Not violated by bailiff's statement to jury foreperson that jurors should all agree with verdict if polled. 6 H. App. 320, 721 P.2d 718.

Where trial court found statements of jurors on voir dire credible, statements were sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was not denied an impartial jury. 85 H. 49 (App.), 936 P.2d 1297.

Where State failed to rebut presumption of prejudice to defendant resulting from juror’s improper investigation of details concerning defendant’s welfare status, court properly granted motion for new trial. 89 H. 215 (App.), 971 P.2d 304.

Plain error where trial court’s answer to jury communication was prejudicially insufficient, misleading and affected defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict as jury may have wrongly believed based on court’s answer that if they failed to reach unanimous agreement as to the affirmative defense of entrapment, the defense was not applicable and a guilty verdict was required. 90 H. 489 (App.), 979 P.2d 85.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 6.

Factors considered in determining deprivation of speedy trial. 64 H. 65, 637 P.2d 407.

In consenting to be tried with co-defendants, defendant could not claim that co-defendant's motions were not attributable to defendant. 64 H. 65, 637 P.2d 407.

One year and three week delay between arrest and trial is presumptively prejudicial. 64 H. 65, 637 P.2d 407.

HRPP rule 48 (dismissal) has broader purpose than constitutional right to speedy trial. 73 H. 352, 833 P.2d 66.

Defendant not deprived of right, where although the reason for the delay leaned marginally in defendant’s favor, the weight attributed to that factor was offset by defendant’s eleventh-hour assertion of defendant’s right and defendant’s failure to even attempt to demonstrate that defendant was actually prejudiced by the delay in the commencement of trial. 76 H. 415, 879 P.2d 520.

Defendants not deprived of constitutional right to speedy trial where although the reason for the delay factor weighed in favor of the defendants, it was outweighed by the facts that defendants failed to assert their right and failed to demonstrate that they were actually prejudiced by the delay in bringing them to trial. 78 H. 54, 890 P.2d 291.

Where defendant was substantially responsible for pretrial delay and failed to assert right to speedy trial, allowing defendant’s case to proceed to trial after eleven-month delay was not error. 92 H. 192, 990 P.2d 90.

Defendant not deprived of right to speedy trial; nineteen-month delay between arrest and trial is presumptively prejudicial; defendant's right to speedy trial accrued when arrested. 4 H. App. 222, 665 P.2d 165.

Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. 8 H. App. 284, 800 P.2d 623.

Among factors to be considered is prejudice to defendant caused by oppressive pretrial incarceration, ignominy occasioned by pending criminal charges, and difficulty of preparing for trial. 9 H. App. 232, 832 P.2d 737.

Right not violated where delay was caused by defendant's own absence from Hawaii and consequent unavailability for trial, and defendant failed to produce evidence that defendant suffered any prejudice. 83 H. 496 (App.), 927 P.2d 1379.

Cited: 56 H. 378, 537 P.2d 1187.

Not violated where burglary indictment alleged all elements of the crime and record indicated the specific crime intended to be committed, though specific crime not alleged. 66 H. 312, 660 P.2d 39.

Accomplice instruction improper where each defendant was charged separately and charges did not inform them of circumstances in which they acted as accomplices. 72 H. 278, 815 P.2d 428.

State failed to adequately inform defendant of nature and cause of the §134-6(a) charge. 78 H. 66, 890 P.2d 303.

Section 485-21 provides an essential element of offense charged, when a defendant is charged with a criminal violation of Uniform Securities Act; counts of indictment, which cited to §485-21, were insufficient, as counts did not include essential elements of offenses charged. 78 H. 373, 894 P.2d 70.

Violated where minutes before trial was to commence, complaint against defendant amended from driving while license suspended to driving without a license. 81 H. 76 (App.), 912 P.2d 573.