Case Notes

Question whether trial court may rely solely on the pre- sentence diagnosis and report to make finding that defendant is a multiple offender raised but not decided. 56 H. 32, 526 P.2d 1200.

Extended sentence imposed on multiple offender held not cruel and unusual punishment. 56 H. 343, 537 P.2d 724.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt in separate proceeding is required. 56 H. 628, 548 P.2d 632.

Where prior conviction is an element of the crime, it should be proven in the case in chief in a one stage proceeding. 57 H. 339, 555 P.2d 1199.

Applicability of the due process guarantees to the two-step process of imposing a sentence for extended term. 60 H. 71, 588 P.2d 394.

Contents of record on appeal. 60 H. 71, 588 P.2d 394.

In paragraph (4), the criterion that the extended term is "warranted" is construed to mean "necessary for the protection of the public." 60 H. 71, 588 P.2d 394.

Provisions not unconstitutional. 60 H. 100, 588 P.2d 409.

Trial court permissibly relied on pre-sentence report in finding defendant to be a persistent offender, where facts establishing defendant as such offender were in the record apart from the pre-sentence report. 60 H. 100, 588 P.2d 409.

Paragraph (4) interpreted as not requiring separate step to determine criminality. 60 H. 308, 588 P.2d 394.

Full-hearing requirement under section does not apply to adjustments of pre-penal code sentences under Act 188, SL 1975. 61 H. 517, 606 P.2d 83.

Criteria for imposition of extended term on multiple offender. 62 H. 112, 612 P.2d 110.

At the voir dire stage, it is uncertain whether the extended term provision for a multiple offender is applicable, and a defendant charged with three counts of robbery in the first degree is not entitled to twelve peremptory challenges pursuant to HRPP 24(b). 63 H. 354, 628 P.2d 1018.

Not cruel and unusual punishment under circumstances. 63 H. 488, 630 P.2d 619.

Sufficient evidence to impose extended term. 63 H. 488, 630 P.2d 619; 63 H. 636, 633 P.2d 1115.

Defendant should be permitted to show that counsel was ineffective at time of prior convictions. 65 H. 354, 652 P.2d 1119.

Circuit court did not err in first step of extended term sentencing procedure; case remanded to circuit court for specification of reasons for determining that extended terms were necessary for protection of public and entry of findings of fact to support that determination. 78 H. 383, 894 P.2d 80.

No abuse of discretion in court sentencing defendant to extended terms of imprisonment under §706-661 and this section where, inter alia, court considered each of the factors enumerated in §706-606 and all the mitigating factors raised by defendant. 83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258.

A psychiatric or psychological evaluation of a defendant under paragraph (3) does not require a face-to-face interview in cases where defendant refuses to be examined. 85 H. 258, 942 P.2d 522.

Where witness testimonies provided proof beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had significant history of dangerousness resulting in criminally violent conduct, extended term sentence under paragraph (3) proper and necessary for protection of public. 85 H. 258, 942 P.2d 522.

COMMENTARY ON §§706-661 AND 662

These sections provide for extended terms of imprisonment for the exceptionally difficult defendant. The Code's limited recognition of consecutive sentences, and its attempt to provide lower authorized sentences for the majority of convicted defendants whose records or situations do not suggest the need for extended incarceration, necessitates some provision for dealing with the persistent, professional, dangerous, and multiple offender. Unlike other offenders, these defendants should be subject to possible extended terms because their records or situations indicate that extended incarceration may be necessary to protect the public. In these cases, rehabilitation, if possible, is unlikely to be achieved within an ordinary term.

The Code takes a flexible approach with respect to extended imprisonment. If one or more of the grounds provided by §706-662 is established, it remains discretionary with the court whether an extended term will be imposed--its imposition is not mandatory.

Section 706-662 authorizes an extended term in the case of (1) a persistent offender, (2) a professional criminal, (3) a dangerous person, and (4) a multiple offender. Subsections (1) through (4) state the minimal requirements for each of the findings. These requirements are not intended as mandates, or even guidelines, but rather as limitations on the court's exercise of discretion.

[T]he existence of the minimal conditions do not make the finding necessary nor is it, indeed, compulsory in any case. Minimal conditions are stated as a safeguard against possible abusive findings, not as a judgment that establishment of the conditions necessarily demands that the finding in question should be made. Of course, before the court can make the ultimate finding required, it must find that the minimal conditions are established.[1]

SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §§706-661 AND 662

Act 210, Session Laws 1978, amended §706-662 by adding paragraph (5), finding offenses against the elderly and the handicapped to be a significant problem.

Act 166, Session Laws 1981, amended §706-662 by deleting the requirement that defendants be at least twenty-two years of age before they become subject to possible extended terms as persistent offenders or professional criminals, it appearing that those most often arrested and sentenced for felonies fell in the eighteen to twenty-five year age group. As amended, the section authorizes the court to impose extended terms, in appropriate cases, regardless of the defendant's age. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 705.

Act 280, Session Laws 1985, amended §706-662 to impose an extended prison term on a defendant who, while committing or attempting to commit certain felony offenses, inflicts serious bodily injury on a person who is blind, paraplegic, quadriplegic, sixty years old or older, or eight years of age or younger. This amendment addresses the needs of persons who cannot protect themselves as well as expresses condemnation of defendants who commit crimes against those persons. House Standing Committee Report No. 398, Senate Standing Committee Report No. 852.

Act 305, Session Laws 1988, amended §706-662 by clarifying the definition of dangerousness by removing old language and using language which conforms more to "state of the art" knowledge about violence prediction. The legislature stated that this would lead to an increase in the accuracy of violence prediction by focusing on the two principal components, history of dangerousness and present triggers of violent behavior. This section was also amended to allow the introduction of victim- related data in order to establish dangerousness. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 2153.

Act 3, Session Laws 1996, amended §706-662 by adding manslaughter to the crimes for which an extended term of imprisonment may be given when the defendant inflicts serious or substantial bodily injury on a person sixty years or older, handicapped, or eight years or younger. The legislature found that the elderly, handicapped, and children are more vulnerable and should be provided more protection, and that adding manslaughter to the enhanced sentencing statute was consistent with the policy to protect the more vulnerable people in the community. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 2036, House Standing Committee Report No. 988-96.

Act 286, Session Laws 1999, amended §706-661 to make the extended term of imprisonment for murder in the second degree an indeterminate life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Conference Committee Report No. 89.

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§§706-661 and 662 Commentary:

1. M.P.C., Tentative Draft No. 2, comments at 41-42 (1954).