Cited in holding that a constitutional amendment is necessary to eliminate the function and scope of the grand jury. Att. Gen. Op. 68-10.

Included Offenses in Hawaii Case Law and the Rights to Trial by Jury: Coherence or Confusion. II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 77.

Fitness to Proceed: Compassion or Prejudice? II HBJ No. 13, at pg. 135.

Administering Justice or Just Administration: The Hawaii Supreme Court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals. 14 UH L. Rev. 271.

State v. Lessary: The Hawaii Supreme Court's Contribution to Double Jeopardy Law. 17 UH L. Rev. 269.

Criminal Procedure Rights Under the Hawaii Constitution Since 1992. 18 UH L. Rev. 683.

Where indictment mechanism is employed, it must be through an unprejudiced grand jury. 53 H. 226, 491 P.2d 1089.

Although an accused is guaranteed the right to presentment or indictment by a fair and impartial grand jury, the mere absence of an independent grand jury counsel does not establish that the due process rights of the accused were violated. 63 H. 412, 629 P.2d 1111; 63 H. 633, 633 P.2d 1113.

Not violated by indictment which specifies all necessary elements of crime of burglary but does not allege specific crime intended to be committed. 66 H. 312, 660 P.2d 39.

Count of complaint did not allege all of the essential elements of a §134-6(a) offense, thereby failing to ensure that district court had before it all facts necessary to find probable cause on that charge and violating defendant’s rights under this section. 78 H. 66, 890 P.2d 303.

Section 485-21 provides an essential element of offense charged, when a defendant is charged with a criminal violation of Uniform Securities Act; counts of indictment, which cited to §485-21, were insufficient, as counts did not include essential elements of offenses charged. 78 H. 373, 894 P.2d 70.

Grand jury was presented with sufficient information to determine the existence of probable cause that material distributed to minor by defendant was pornographic for minors under §712-1210(7)(a). 82 H. 474, 923 P.2d 891.

Sufficiency of for credit card offenses. 4 H. App. 52, 659 P.2d 83.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

State may go beyond federal requisites in protecting right under state constitution. 52 H. 527, 480 P.2d 148; 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657.

Unless Miranda warnings are given, defendant's statement cannot be used either as evidence in prosecution's case or to impeach defendant's testimony. 53 H. 254, 492 P.2d 657.

Miranda warnings apply only where person is being subjected to custodial interrogation. 58 H. 94, 564 P.2d 1271.

Miranda fails to restrict State's use of voluntary statement not resulting from custodial interrogation. 58 H. 323, 568 P.2d 1200.

Custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. 59 H. 357, 581 P.2d 752.

Use immunity conferred by statute is not adequate to supplant constitutional privilege. 62 H. 269, 614 P.2d 915.

Compulsion to produce handwriting examples does not constitute unreasonable search and seizure nor does it violate self-incrimination clause. 62 H. 364, 616 P.2d 193.

Default judgment for failure to make an accounting did not violate privilege where no evidence that information sought by accounting would incriminate defendant. 68 H. 608, 726 P.2d 254.

Violated by introduction of evidence that defendant invoked right, where whether defendant had done so not at issue. 69 H. 68, 733 P.2d 690.

Defendant did not waive right to counsel; second interrogation was not "same interrogation" for purposes of Miranda warnings. 69 H. 461, 748 P.2d 365.

Drug testing does not infringe upon the privilege against self-incrimination. 72 H. 67, 806 P.2d 407.

Defendant's statement to police, made while wearing blanket during custodial interrogation, was not coerced under totality of circumstances. 72 H. 327, 817 P.2d 1054.

Constitutional right was not voluntarily waived by defendant's confession to theft where waiver was predicated on prior illegal search and State failed to meet burden of showing that taint of illegal search had been dissipated or that there was an independent source inducing defendant to waive right. 72 H. 505, 824 P.2d 833.

Not violated where court requested defendant to identify self for purposes of identification in compliance with Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure 43(a) (requiring presence of defendant at trial). 72 H. 573, 827 P.2d 648.

Use at sentencing of statements previously obtained in violation of a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination violates that defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process. 74 H. 424, 848 P.2d 376.

Defendant’s mental and physical condition at time of defendant’s interview with detective did not render defendant’s statement involuntary; where defendant complained detective repeatedly exhorted defendant to tell the whole story and wheedled a confession out of defendant through misrepresentations, detective’s tactics did not amount to mental or psychological coercion, rendering defendant’s consequent statement involuntary and inadmissible. 74 H. 479, 849 P.2d 58.

Circuit court’s error in failing to expressly state findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to alleged violation of appellant’s right against self-incrimination was harmless error; reversal of appellant’s original conviction was not based on prosecution’s use of illegally obtained confessions and appellant had never alleged that appellant was in any way compelled to testify at first trial. 76 H. 237, 873 P.2d 775.

When a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel during custodial interrogation, the police must either cease all questioning or seek non-substantive clarification of the suspect’s request, and if, upon clarification, the defendant unambiguously and unequivocally invokes right to counsel, all substantive questioning must cease until counsel is present. 77 H. 17, 881 P.2d 504.

Coercive conduct of a private person may be sufficient to render a confession inadmissible based on article I, §5 and this section of Hawai`i constitution. 77 H. 51, 881 P.2d 538.

Defendants were induced to make inculpatory statements and to consent to search of their hotel room in violation of article I, §§7 and [10] of Hawai`i constitution. 78 H. 433, 896 P.2d 889.

To protect the right to testify under Hawai`i constitution, trial courts must advise criminal defendants of their right to testify and must obtain on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify. 79 H. 226, 900 P.2d 1293.

Court properly accepted witness' claim of privilege where witness' testimony in proceeding might have had some tendency to provide a "link in the chain" of evidence against witness in another killing. 80 H. 307, 909 P.2d 1122.

Right to remain silent waived where defendant, after being properly given Miranda warnings and additionally being told that everything defendant said was "on the record", initiated dialogue with officer. 80 H. 439, 911 P.2d 74.

"Public safety" exception to Miranda not formally adopted by Hawaii supreme court to apply to this section and was inapplicable to case; thus statements by defendant subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings inadmissible in evidence. 87 H. 71, 951 P.2d 934.

Where Miranda warnings not first given to defendant in custody, defendant's statements to officer regarding device found in defendant's truck and device's purpose were unlawfully obtained and thus inadmissible. 87 H. 71, 951 P.2d 934.

A trial court must pass on a defendant’s attempted withdrawal of the prior waiver of his or her right to testify, tendered before the commencement of closing arguments, pursuant to the "liberal approach", whereas such an attempted withdrawal tendered thereafter is subject to the "manifest injustice" standard. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where defendant did not meet burden of establishing plausible and legitimate reasons for withdrawal of defendant’s prior waiver of defendant’s right to testify, defendant failed to present "fair and just reasons" for defendant’s request to exercise defendant’s right to testify in defendant’s own behalf; thus trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that it would not reopen case. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Where trial court’s denial of defendant’s post-verdict motion for a new trial --based on defendant’s claim that defendant’s attempt to withdraw defendant’s waiver of right to testify in defendant’s own behalf should have been allowed --was not "manifestly unjust", no abuse of discretion. 88 H. 407, 967 P.2d 239.

Prosecutor's statements not improper comment upon defendant's failure to testify. 3 H. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807.

Defendant’s constitutional and statutory right to testify in defendant’s own defense was violated where judge reproached defendant to follow defendant’s attorney’s advice and thus refrain from testifying, and the violation was plain error; denial of the right to testify was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 78 H. 115 (App.), 890 P.2d 702.

See also notes to U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

Retrial not barred though prosecutor's comments caused mistrial, where no showing that prosecution intended to provoke mistrial. 69 H. 44, 731 P.2d 1261.

A nolle prosequi entered over the defendant's objection, after jeopardy has attached, terminates the prosecution and bars any subsequent trial for the same offense. 69 H. 618, 753 P.2d 806.

Jeopardy attached where defendant had no notice or opportunity to testify on nolle prosequi motion. 71 H. 260, 787 P.2d 692.

No double jeopardy where defendant was acquitted of one of the counts. 72 H. 56, 806 P.2d 402.

Jeopardy attached for criminal charges in circuit court when defendant was sentenced for criminal contempt in family court where charges were based on same conduct supporting contempt conviction. 72 H. 164, 811 P.2d 815, cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 194.

Subsequent retrial of murder conviction reversed on appeal not barred by double jeopardy clause where lower court acted outside scope of its mandate in dismissing indictment and defendant was acquitted of another charge involving proof of conduct that was neither an element of the murder charge of which defendant was convicted nor conduct on which liability was found. 72 H. 480, 825 P.2d 64.

Retrial not barred by double jeopardy clause where there was no prosecutorial intent to goad defendant into moving for mistrial. 73 H. 289, 834 P.2d 275.

Reprosecution barred because defendant was subjected to former jeopardy in first trial and trial court erroneously declared mistrial without defendant’s consent or a showing of manifest necessity. 75 H. 195, 857 P.2d 585.

Hawaii constitution provides greater protection against multiple prosecutions than U.S. Constitution; requires application of "same conduct" test. 75 H. 446, 865 P.2d 150.

Circuit court not clearly erroneous in finding that prosecutor did not intentionally provoke defendants into moving for mistrial; thus court correctly concluded retrial not prohibited by double jeopardy. 77 H. 351, 884 P.2d 729.

Appellant's new sentence did not contravene right against double jeopardy even if it potentially affected appellant's future eligibility for parole. 79 H. 281, 901 P.2d 481.

Reprosecution not barred by double jeopardy where trial court's declaration of mistrial supported by manifest necessity; court sufficiently considered alternatives available. 79 H. 461, 903 P.2d 1282.

As §286-261(d) did not require defendant to submit to needs assessment nor undergo any treatment for alcohol dependence, application of that section with DUI conviction under §291-4 not "multiple punishments for same offense". 80 H. 8, 904 P.2d 893.

Remanding case for retrial on lesser included offenses following appellate determination that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support conviction of greater offense did not violate clause. 80 H. 126, 906 P.2d 612.

Defendant not subjected to multiple punishments as a result of administrative driver's license revocation under §286-261 and DUI conviction under §291-4 as administrative revocation non-punitive and purely remedial in nature. 81 H. 226, 915 P.2d 700.

Because counseling and assessment, as consequence of administrative driver's license revocation under §286-261(d), not punitive but purely remedial, subsequent DUI conviction did not expose defendant to multiple "punishments"; defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds thus properly denied. 82 H. 446, 923 P.2d 388.

Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, premised on protection against multiple punishments for same offense, not effectively unreviewable on appeal and thus not immediately appealable under collateral order exception. 82 H. 446, 923 P.2d 388.

Jeopardy did not attach where defendant failed to file a timely claim for forfeited property under §712A-10(4). 83 H. 141, 925 P.2d 311.

Where defendant's conviction on non-existent attempted reckless manslaughter charge vacated, remand for retrial on original charge of attempted first degree murder unconstitutional and also violation of §701-110(1). 83 H. 335, 926 P.2d 1258.

Section bars retrial for a charge when the government's deliberate trial strategy, which was completely incompatible with another approach it could have pursued, but expressly chose not to, accompanied the termination of the first trial without the jury passing upon that charge. 85 H. 128, 938 P.2d 559.

Not violated by prosecution's appeal from judgment of acquittal following jury's verdict of guilty pursuant to §641-13(9). 87 H. 108, 952 P.2d 865.

As conviction for manslaughter due to an extreme mental or emotional disturbance under §707-702(2) is deemed an acquittal of murder, double jeopardy barred defendant’s reprosecution for second degree murder under §707-701.5. 88 H. 356, 966 P.2d 1082.

Prosecution not barred from reprosecuting defendant for offense of reckless manslaughter under §707-702(1)(a) as reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder and remanding a case for retrial on lesser included offenses not barred by double jeopardy. 88 H. 356, 966 P.2d 1082.

Where, upon defendant’s own motion, place to keep firearms count under §134-6 was dismissed on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, retrial on the place to keep firearms charge not barred by double jeopardy clauses of U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions. 88 H. 389, 967 P.2d 221.

If guilty plea is validly set aside, subsequent trial does not violate prohibition against double jeopardy. 4 H. App. 566, 670 P.2d 834.

No prohibition from charging a defendant with having committed one crime in two different ways. 8 H. App. 506, 810 P.2d 672.

No double jeopardy for convictions under §§707-734 and 712-1217. 8 H. App. 535, 813 P.2d 335.

Retrial barred where reversal of DUI conviction based on improperly admitted test result from breath-testing instrument was for insufficiency of evidence, not trial error. 9 H. App. 130, 828 P.2d 813.

Retrial not barred where defendant moved for dismissal and was successful in having the charge dismissed before a determination was made of whether defendant was guilty or not guilty and where defendant did not make any showing that prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial. 10 H. App. 491, 878 P.2d 739.

Clause violated where defendant, upon being resentenced for same offense, not given credit for imprisonment already served and fines already paid. 82 H. 83 (App.), 919 P.2d 995.

As kidnapping statute §707-720(d) and third degree sexual assault statute §707-732(1)(e) intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil, defendant's conviction and punishment for both offenses not barred under this section. 85 H. 92 (App.), 937 P.2d 933.